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INTRODUCTION	
	
“In	 the	 first	 place,	 we	 don’t	 like	 to	 be	 called	 ‘refugees.’	 We	 ourselves	 call	 one	 another	
‘newcomers’	 or	 ‘immigrants.’”	 Already	 here,	 in	 the	 first	 sentence	 of	 Arendt’s	 essay	 “We	
Refugees,”	does	 the	hiatus	of	 refugee	status	become	manifest.	A	divide	already	opens	up	
between	different	habits	of	reference.	Refugees	refer	to	themselves	in	one	way,	non-refugees	
refer	 to	 them	 in	another,	and	so	does	the	projected	or	desired	possibility	of	one	world	 in	
which	 both	 refugees	 and	 non-refugees	 might	 find	 accommodation,	 split	 into	 two	 very	
different	realities.	Consciousness	of	the	split	is	of	course	solely	that	of	the	refugees,	at	first.	
Initially,	the	hiatus	 is	theirs	only.	Others	–	non-refugees	–	remain	soundly	oblivious	to	this	
fundamental	split	until	such	time	as	it	brutally	breaks	into	their	world	too,	for	instance,	when	
the	corpse	of	a	four-year	old	child	washes	up	on	a	beach,	and	washes	up	on	every	doorstep	
in	 a	 succession	of	media	waves.	And	 then	 the	hiatus	 is	 suddenly	 everywhere	 and	no	one	
remains	exempted.	
	
As	the	last	sentence	of	Arendt’s	essay	contends	forcefully,	the	split	begins	with	the	refugee	
status	of	some,	but	it	ends	with	the	bigger	split	of	a	world	that	begins	to	falter	and	fall	apart:	
“The	comity	of	European	peoples	went	to	pieces	when,	and	because,	it	allowed	its	weakest	
member	to	be	excluded	and	persecuted.”	The	comity	of	European	peoples	show	all	signs	of	
going	to	pieces	again	today.	When	the	comity	of	peoples	goes	to	pieces,	it	is	not	only	common	
space	that	cracks	up,	but	also	common	time,	the	common	time	that	warrants	common	space	
according	to	Kant’s	Schematismuslehre.	It	is	ultimately	this	breaking	of	time	–	the	hiatus	of	
time	–	that	Arendt	thematises	elsewhere	with	reference	to	“the	desolate	aimless	wanderings	
of	Israeli	tribes	in	the	wilderness	and	the	dangers	which	befell	Aeneas	before	he	reached	the	
Italian	shore.”	“[T]his	hiatus,”	she	continues,	obviously	creeps	into	all	time	speculations	which	
deviate	from	the	currently	accepted	notion	of	time	as	a	continuous	flow.”1		
	
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	engage	with	the	hiatus	status	of	refugees	that	becomes	manifest	
in	Arendt’s	essay	“We	Refugees.”	It	will	elaborate	this	hiatus	status	as	it	becomes	manifest	in	
the	political,	legal,	social	and	personal	situation	of	refugees	that	are	(1)	torn	from	the	worlds	
within	 and	 around	 which	 they	 have	 constructed	 stable	 patterns	 of	 existence	 through	 a	
process	 of	 foundational	 familiarisation,	 (2)	 thrown	 onto	 faraway	 shorelines,	 and/or	
compelled	to	cross	regional	borders	that	they	never	contemplated	to	cross,	and	3)	compelled	
to	 overcome	 their	 own	 resistance	 to	 relocation	 and	 re-familiarisation	 with	 their	 new	
circumstances,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 resistance	 of	 others	 (local	 citizens	 and	 other	 established	
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residents)	who	fear	this	re-familiarisation	and	consider	it	a	de-familiarising	threat	to	their	own	
sense	of	familiar	belonging.	
	
The	hiatus	that	becomes	manifest	in	the	course	of	this	uprooting	event	and	the	process	of	
double	de-familiarisation	concerns	the	way	in	which	a	form	of	life	gets	terminated	and	gives	
way	to	an	interim	phase	of	formless	life	until	such	time	as	re-entry	into	a	new	form	of	life	
ensues.	 This	 re-entry	 invariably	 requires	 a	 re-commencement	 from	 scratch	 that	 must	
overcome	the	twofold	resistance	to	re-familiarisation	mentioned	above,	the	resistance	to	re-
entry	of	the	one	who	must	re-enter,	and	the	resistance	of	others	who	perceive	this	re-entry	
as	 a	 threat.	 In	 other	 words,	 once	 a	 form	 of	 life	 gives	 way	 to	 formless	 life,	 the	 re-
commencement	of	formed	life	becomes	a	double	ordeal,	the	dimensions	of	which	are	close	
too	insurmountable.	This,	then,	is	the	hiatus	of	refugee	status	with	which	this	paper	will	be	
concerned.	The	paper	will	also	show,	however,	how	this	hiatus	status	of	refugees	comes	to	
contaminate	the	formed	life	and	well-arranged	spatial	and	temporal	coordinates	of	regular	
citizenship	 and	 lawful	 residence.	 It	 will	 show,	 in	 other	 words,	 how	 the	 lawful	 comity	 of	
peoples	also	breaks	down	when	it	fails	to	accommodate	the	refugee;	when	it	fails	to	facilitate	
the	re-entry	into	formed	life	and	well-ordered	spatial	and	temporal	coordinates	of	those	who	
have	fallen	into	cracks	of	existence	that	are	devoid	of	time	and	space.		
	
Here,	then,	is	where	this	paper	will	endeavour	to	pause:	at	an	event	that	1)	tears	away	all	
conditions	of	familiarity	and	familiarisation,	that	is,	tears	away	everything	that	gives	form	to	
life	and	2),	catapults	what	remains	–	the	bigger	or	smaller	rests	of	“familiar”	hominoid	form,	
be	it	alive	or	no	longer	so	–	 into	an	unformed	and	unfamiliar	zone	of	existence	where	the	
resistance	to	re-familiarisation	and	the	resistance	to	form	is	the	only	common	characteristic	
that	still	resembles	form	and	familiarity.	This	is	where	this	paper	will	endeavour	to	pause	in	
the	way	one	pushes	the	pause	button	on	a	DVD	reader	and/or	another	digital	reading	device.	
The	 function	of	 these	devices	 is	 to	produce	semblances	of	 flows	and	 transitions	–	motion	
pictures,	in	other	words	–	through	purposefully	selected	registers	of	speed.	In	performing	this	
task,	digital	 reading	machines	ultimately	aim	at	nothing	but	 the	obfuscation	of	 the	hiatus	
between	every	frame	in	a	sequence	of	frames,	to	use	the	now	outdated	metaphor	of	a	pre-
digital	 age.	 The	 gaps	 between	 the	 frames	may	 be	 narrow,	 but	 they	 are	 irreducible.	 They	
secure	and	safeguard	a	different	zone	of	existence	that	the	reading	machine	cannot	register,	
but	also	not	eradicate.	The	machine	ultimately	only	produces	the	semblance	of	erasure	and	
smooth	transition.2		
	
The	endeavour	to	pause	the	machine	will	nevertheless	just	remain	an	endeavour.	It	is	bound	
to	fail.	It	is	bound	to	fail	because	the	human	mind	is	itself	an	unstoppable	“motion	picture	
projector.”	At	stake	in	this	paper	will	nevertheless	be	an	“against	all	odds	attempt”	to	pause	
																																																						
2	Consider	in	this	regard	the	video	installation	24	Hour	Psycho	by	Douglas	Gordon,	
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recollection	of	the	original,	and	at	the	same	time	he	is	drawn	into	the	future	by	his	expectations	of	an	already	
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Douglas	Gordon,	Cambridge:	Massachusetts,	MIT	Press	16.	I	am	indebted	to	Wikipedia	for	the	reference	to	
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this	projector	in	order	to	register	the	moment	that	times	breaks,	the	moment	that	futures	
and	pasts	no	longer	hold	together,	the	moment	when	an	instance	of	sheer	existence	–	sheer	
“non-transitional”	 existence	 –	 manifests	 itself	 as	 torn	 out	 of	 time,	 torn	 from	 time,	
expropriated	in	the	most	fundamental	sense	of	the	word	when	expropriation	concerns	the	
expropriation	of	all	pasts	and	futures.	Existence	without	time	and	out	of	time.	In	other	words:	
timeless	existence.	
	
We	shall	see	below	that	Arendt	once	also	contemplated	this	moment	with	reference	to	Franz	
Kafka	in	a	way	that	resonates	clearly	with	the	passage	from	On	Revolution	quoted	above,	only	
to	give	it	up	again	with	little	delay.	In	the	final	analysis,	she	remained	predominantly	given	to	
forms	of	life,	and	the	political	formation	of	these	forms.	Her	famous	critique	of	the	French	
revolution	may	well	have	been	a	rhetorical	sublimation	of	a	deep	fear	of	formless	life,	fear	of	
formless	life	that	is	torn	out	of	time	and	dropped	into	a	crack	of	timelessness.	This	is	what	the	
French	Revolution	 signified	 for	her:	 The	moment	 that	 the	 timeless	 life	of	 the	poor	–	 that	
unframed	frame	that	always	threatens	to	wreck	the	motion	machine	–		appeared	on	the	scene	
of	history	and	threatened	to	obstruct	the	cinema	of	public	appearance.3	
	
In	a	recent	essay	I	have	attempted	to	register	or	notice	this	timeless	existence	with	regard	to	
the	life	and	death	of	Bram	Fischer,	defence	counsel	 in	the	Rivionia	Trial,	descendant	of	an	
elite	Afrikaner	family	with	every	aspect	of	generations	of	familiarisation	with	the	world	well	
intact,	only	 to	become	a	refugee	 in	 the	most	real	or	“perfect”	sense	of	 the	word:	a	 failed	
refugee,	one	who	ultimately	crossed	all	significant	boundaries,	between	life	and	death	and	
between	substance	and	nothingness	without	crossing	any	geographic	international	border.	
The	only	border	that	he	managed	to	cross	was	the	one	between	civil	life,	or	formed	life,	and	
the	staggered	phases	of	formless	existence	that	begin	where	civil	life	ends:		imprisonment	–	
incarcerated	death	–	secret	incineration	-	nothingness.	It	is	still	not	known	what	became	of	
Bram	Fischer’s	ashes	in	the	end.	In	a	recent	exploration	of	this	reversed	narrative	of	Fischer’s	
life,	I	invoked	the	phrase	“When	time	gives.”4	There	is	no	discrepancy	between	this	“giving	of	
time”	and	 the	 “breaking	of	 time”	 that	 I	 have	begun	 to	 invoke	here.	 The	 “giving	of	 time”,	
invoked	with	reference	to	Bram	Fischer,	was	indeed	a	case	of	“time	breaking.”	“Something	
will	have	to	give,”	we	often	say,	when	tensions	become	too	much.	We	invariably	mean	by	
that,	that	something	or	someone	is	going	to	break	apart.	We	often	talk	about	the	splitting	of	
the	universe	when	we	talk	like	this,	without	realising	that	we	do.	
	
The	endeavour	to	pause	the	motion	machine	and	to	register	the	moment	when	time	breaks	
ultimately	requires	recourse	to	a	particular	kind	of	 language,	a	language	of	which	the	very	
aim	 is	 to	 halt	 the	 flow	 of	 time	 and	 to	 wrest	 from	 it	 a	 singular	 date,	 so	 as	 to	 save	 its	
unrepeatable	singularity.		This	is	the	purpose	of	poetry,	Paul	Celan	tells	us,	as	we	shall	see	
																																																						
3	I	am	alluding	to	this	paragraph	in	Arendt	On	Revolution	48:	“[T]his	multitude,	appearing	for	the	first	time	in	
broad	daylight,	was	actually	the	multitude	of	the	poor	and	the	downtrodden,	who	every	century	before	had	
hidden	in	darkness	and	shame.	What	from	then	on	has	been	irrevocable,	and	what	the	agents	and	spectators	
of	revolution	immediately	recognized	as	such,	was	that	the	public	realm	–	reserved,	as	far	as	memory	could	
reach,	to	those	who	were	free,	namely	carefree	of	all	the	worries	that	are	connected	with	life’s	necessity,	with	
bodily	needs	–	should	offer	its	space	and	its	light	to	this	immense	majority	who	are	not	free	because	they	are	
driven	by	daily	needs.”	
4	See	Van	der	Walt	“When	Time	Gives:	Reflections	on	two	Rivonia	Renegades”	in	Awol	Allo	(ed),	The	Court	
Room	as	a	Space	of	Resistance.	Reflections	on	the	Legacy	of	the	Rivonia	Trial,	(Aldershot:	Ashgate	Publishing,	
2015)	37-62.	
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towards	 the	 end	 of	 this	 paper.	 The	 poetry	 that	 Celan	 has	 in	mind	 can	 of	 course	 not	 be	
presented	or	even	represented	in	this	paper.	Celan	in	any	case	tells	us	that	he	is	referring	to	
a	poem	that	does	and	cannot	not	exist:	“Ich	spreche	ja	von	dem	Gedicht,	das	es	nicht	gibt!”5	I	
will	nevertheless	allude	to	this	non-existing	poem	towards	the	end	of	this	paper	to	resist	the	
language	of	law;	more	specifically	in	this	case,	to	resist	the	language	of	international	law	that	
promises	one	thing	and	blandly	delivers	another.	Of	course,	as	already	conceded	above,	this	
paper	will	also	fail	to	deliver.	It	will	fail	to	pause	the	motion	machine	that	it	seeks	to	pause.	It	
will	ultimately	not	enter	 the	 timeless	crack	of	 time.	 It	will	not	meet	 the	 refugee	stranded	
there.	In	this	respect,	it	will	do	little	or	no	better	than	the	law.	All	that	it	can	hope	to	do,	in	
the	end,	is	to	keep	the	memory	of	failed	promises	alive	in	a	way	in	which	the	language	of	law	
cannot	do,	and	is	also	not	meant	to	do.	But	it	will	also	show	how	a	regime	of	law	itself	turns	
into	a	regime	of	lawlessness	when	its	broken	promises	become	all	too	glaringly	evident.	
	
This	 is	the	end	of	the	introduction	to	this	paper.	From	now	one,	the	rest	of	the	paper	will	
unfold	in	three	steps.	It	will	pause	the	DVD	reader	twice,	so	to	speak,	to	bring	into	focus	–	still	
badly	blurred,	no	doubt	–	the	two	moments	of	radical	de-familiarisation	and	resistance	to	re-
familiarisation	that	mark	the	hiatus	of	refugee	status.	And	then	it	will	stop	it	a	third	time	for	
purpose	of	zooming	in	on	the	hiatus	itself,	or	at	least	to	the	limited	extent	that	this	can	be	
done.		The	paper	will	accordingly	unfold	in	three	parts	or	sections.	Section	I	will	focus	on	de-
familiarisation.	Section	II	will	focus	on	the	twofold	resistance	to	re-familiarisation	announced	
above.	Section	III	will	pause	one	more	time	to	determine	how	much	we	can	possibly	glean	
from	the	hiatus	itself,	and	of	those	who	have	been	drawn	into	its	vortex.	All	three	sections	
will	 pay	 attention	 to	 key	 themes	 in	 Arendt’s	 work.	 They	 will	 also	 lean	 on	 two	 recent	
monographs	 on	 Arendt,	 both	 of	which	 highlight	 concerns	with	wandering,	migration	 and	
migration	status	in	her	work	and	are	therefore	of	specific	importance	of	the	theme	of	this	
paper.	
	
I.	DE-FAMILIARISATION	
	
I	will	rely	on	a	recently	published	monograph	by	Hans-Jörg	Sigwart	to	explain	the	process	of	
“de-familiarisation”	 without	 which	 the	 genesis	 of	 refugee	 status	 cannot	 be	 grasped	 in	
sufficient	depth.	The	title	of	Sigwart’s	book	is	The	Wandering	Thought	of	Hannah	Arendt	and	
the	main	theme	of	the	book	concerns	the	“wandering”	nature	of	Arendt’s	political	theory.	As	
Sigwart	shows	well,	Arendt	consciously	contrasted	this	“wandering”	status	of	political	theory	
with	 the	 unpolitical	 “wondering”	 of	 philosophers.	 Political	 theorists	 are	 wayfarers	 who	
wander	off	into	the	world,	creating	it	in	fact,	while	doing	so.	Philosophers,	to	the	opposite,	
are	narcissistically	embroiled	 in	a	singular	experience	of	existence.	They	are	arrested	by	a	
sense	of	wonderment	that	generally	prevents	them	from	taking	part	in	the	political	creation	
of	and	participation	in	the	world.6	
	
Let	us	take	a	closer	look	at	this	world-creating	force	of	politics	that	Arendt	contemplates.	It	
pivots	on	a	practice	of	politics	that	negotiates	the	tension	between	the	boundless	freedom	to	
create	new	worlds,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	need	to	subject	this	freedom	to	stabilising	limits	
and	 boundaries,	 on	 the	 other.	 This	 practice	 of	 politics	 is	 informed	 by	 a	 very	 specific	
																																																						
5	Paul	Celan,	Der	Meridian	in	Celan,	Gesammelte	Werke	(5	vols,	Frankfurt	a.M:	Suhrkamp,	1983)	III,	199.	
6	Hans-Jörg	Sigwart,	The	Wandering	thought	of	Hannah	Arendt,	London:	Palgrave,	2016,	11-28.	
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“epistemology	of	politics,”	as	Sigwart	calls	it.	At	stake	in	this	“epistemology	of	politics,”	he	
contends,	 is	 an	 “enlarged	 mentality”	 that	 is	 capable	 of	 considering	 matters	 of	 common	
concern	from	the	perspective	of	everyone	concerned	and	not	from	an	individual	or	isolated	
perspective.7	 This	 enlarged	 mentality	 has	 four	 basic	 characteristics:	 1)	 it	 concerns	 an	
interpretive	 integration	 of	 particulars;	 2)	 it	 performs	 an	 interpretive	 self-localization;	 3)	 it	
produces	a	simultaneously	pluralistic	and	common	perspective	of	a	political	“we,”	and	4)	thus	
constitutes,	not	only	an	enlarged	mentality,	but	a	bounded	form	of	enlarged	mentality.8	
	
Let	us	zoom	in	further	on	the	first	two	elements	of	this	epistemology	of	politics,	interpretive	
integration	and	self-localisation.	Interpretive	integration,	explains	Sigwart,	entails	a	“talkative	
and	 argumentative	 interest	 in	 the	 world”	 that	 subsumes	 particular	 observations	 under	
generalisations	 that	 are	 interesting	 to	 everyone	 concretely	 involved.9	 At	 stake	 in	 these	
generalisations	is	the	articulation	of	“concrete	generalisations”	that	are	situated	in	contexts	
of	 common	 concerns.	 This	 situated	 or	 contextual	 character	 of	 the	 generalisations	 that	
interpretive	integration	produces,	distinguishes	them	from	the	context-free	universals	that	
Kant’s	 practical	 philosophy	 contemplated.10	 The	 second	 element,	 self-localisation,	 derives	
from	 the	 first	 and	 could	 be	 considered	 another	 dimension	 of	 the	 first.	 The	 interpretive	
generalisation	of	particular	encounters	turns	the	abstract	totality	of	these	encounters	into	a	
world.	In	the	process	of	doing	so,	it	also	furnishes	the	interpretive	process	itself	with	a	familiar	
and	comprehensible	location.	In	other	words,	the	“talkative	and	argumentative	interest”	in	
“things”	turns	these	“things”	into	the	coordinates	of	a	specific	space	and	a	habitable	world.	It	
turns	 the	 randomly	 scattered	 looseness	 of	 particulars	 into	 the	 “Wirklichkeitsdichte”	 or	
“density”	 of	 “a	 worldly	 reality.”11	 This	 is	 how	 it	 situates	 itself.	 This	 is	 how	 it	 effects	 an	
interpretive	self-localisation.	But	this	is	not	all.	The	interpretive	generalisation	of	particulars	
not	only	produces	the	world	in	which	the	interpretive	subject	finds	a	home,	it	also	produces	
the	 interpretive	 subject	 itself.	 Concomitantly	 to	 its	 production	 of	 world	 density	 or	
Wirklichkeitsdichte,	 “talkative	and	argumentative	 interest	 in	 the	world”	also	produces	 the	
very	density	of	selfhood	and	the	very	density	of	political	agency.	
	
A	political	subject	finally	steps	out	of	the	whole	gamut	of	 interpretive	encounters	through	
which	human	consciousness	turns	its	environment	into	a	common	world.	And	with	it	steps	
into	 view	 –	with	 little	 or	 no	 delay	 –	 the	 third	 characteristic	 of	 “enlarged	mentality”	 that	
underpins	 Arendt’s	 epistemology	 of	 politics.	 The	 interpretative	 emergence	 of	 political	
subjectivity	not	only	entails	a	plurality	of	subjects	that	relate	to	one	another	as	second	and	
third	persons.	It	also	entails	a	collective	subject,	a	veritable	collective	first	person	–	a	we	–	
that	somehow	manages	to	sustain	the	plurality	or	second	and	third	persons	within	itself.	The	
political	understanding	of	this	“we”	in	which	“I”	and	“many	others	are	participating	…	does	…	
not	so	much	imply	to	understand	one	another	as	 individual	persons,	but	to	 look	upon	the	
same	world	from	one	another’s	standpoint,	to	see	the	same	in	very	different	and	frequently	
opposing	aspects.”12	
	
																																																						
7	Sigwart,	63.	
8	Sigwart,	65.	
9	Sigwart,	66.	
10	Sigwart,	67-68.	
11	Sigwart,	73.	
12	Sigwart,	75.	
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The	notion	of	“enlarged	mentality”	that	Sigwart	is	describing	here	with	reference	to	Arendt’s	
epistemology	of	 politics	 comes	 from	Kant.	 Sigwart	 nevertheless	makes	 sure	 that	Arendt’s	
acute	 sensitivity	 for	 the	 historicity	 and	 contextual	 contingency	 of	 all	 interpretive	
generalisations	is	not	lost	upon	his	readers.	It	is	not	Kant’s	a-contextual	universalism	that	is	
at	stake	in	Arendt’s	enlarged	mentality,	but	a	bounded	version	of	it	that	one	associates	with	
the	concrete	sensus	communis	of	an	actual	political	community.	The	space	of	appearance	of	
such	a	concrete	sensus	communis	 cannot	be	 infinite.	 It	 is	“a	 limited	 ‘space’	with	relatively	
concrete	and	stable	boundaries.”13	
	
These	four	essential	epistemological	characteristics	of	political	action	add	up	to	a	description	
of	 political	 understanding	 that	 reads	 like	 a	 page	 taken	 out	 of	 Gadamer’s	Wahrheit	 und	
Methode.14	That	Gadamer	may	well	be	a	ghost	writer	here	would	seem	to	be	confirmed	by	
Sigwart’s	characterisation	of	political	understanding	with	reference	to	Gadamer’s	notion	of	
Einrücken,	 that	 is,	 the	 ability	 to	meaningfully	 relate	 to	 the	 perspectives	 of	 others	 and	 to	
integrate	oneself	…	 into	 the	meaningful	 horizon	of	 a	 common	world	 and	 its	 ‘tradition’	 of	
stories	and	memories.”15	
	
We	will	come	back	once	more	to	Sigwart’s	fine	presentation	of	Arendt’s	“wandering	thought”	
towards	the	end	of	this	essay,	but	we	have	followed	him	far	enough	for	now	to	take	from	it	
what	is	crucial	for	our	endeavour	to	come	to	grips	with	the	process	of	de-familiarisation	that	
culminates	 in	 the	 hiatus	 of	 refugee	 status.	What	 Sigwart	 brings	 to	 our	 attention	with	 his	
meticulous	exposition	of	Arendt’s	epistemology	of	politics	concerns	much	more	than	a	mere	
epistemological	of	politics.	 It	also	concerns	 the	way	 in	which	politics,	understood	broadly,	
becomes	 fundamental	 epistemology;	 not	 only	 in	 Arendt’s	 work,	 but	 in	 the	 whole	
“hermeneutic	tradition,”	so	to	speak.	What	one	sees	him	describing	here,	with	reference	to	
Arendt,	 is	the	way	in	which	the	hermeneutic	or	linguistic	turn	in	philosophy	and	the	social	
sciences	 took	 the	 integration	of	 space	and	 time	away	 from	 the	ahistorical	 transcendental	
epistemology	that	one	associates	with	Kant,	and	relocated	it	in	the	practice	of	finite	historical	
understanding.	Sigwart	effectively	distils	from	Arendt’s	thought	an	explication	of	the	way	in	
which	the	linguistic-political	creation	of	a	common	world	literally	performs	the	integration	of	
common	 time	 and	 space	 that	 Kant’s	 Schematismuslehre	 attributed	 to	 the	 “schematising	
function”	of	transcendental	subjectivity.16	A	proper	grasp	of		this	hermeneutic	relocation	of	
the	 integration	of	 time	 and	 space	 in	 practices	 of	 historical	 narrative	 and	 interpretation	 is	
crucial	for	any	endeavour	to	come	to	terms	with	the	crisis	of	refugee	status,	as	will	become	
clear	presently.	Let	us	first	allow	this	hermeneutic	plot	to	thicken	a	bit	more.	
	
More	or	less	one	and	a	half	centuries	after	Kant,	Claude	Lefort	rearticulated	the	schematising	
integration	of	time	and	space	in	his	inquiry	into	the	role	of	theologico-political	narratives	in	
Western	 politics.	 Lefort	 invoked	 the	 apparent	 “permanence”	 of	 the	 theologico-political	
narratives	 to	 account	 for	 the	 way	 in	 which	 societies	 consider	 themselves	 constrained	 to	
																																																						
13	Sigwart,	81.	
14	See	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Wahrheit	und	Methode,	Tübingen:	J.C.B.	Mohr	(Paul	Siebeck),	1975.		
15	Sigwart,	69,	referring	to	Gadamer,	Wahrheit	und	Methode,	275	(the	last	page	of	the	section	“Das	Beispiel	
des	Klassischen”	–	Sigwart	used	a	later	edition	of	Wahrheit	und	Methode	and	accordingly	cites	a	different	page	
number).	
16	Kant,	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft	in	Werke	in	10	Bänden	(Weischedel	Edition)	vol.	3,	Darmstadt:	
Wissenschaftliche	Buchgesellschaft,	1983,	187-194.		
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account	for	the	“opening”	in	which	they	are	held.17	It	becomes	clear	from	Lefort’s	essay	on	
the	 “permanence	 of	 the	 theologico-political”	 that	 the	 whole	 gamut	 of	 historical	 and	
interpretive	 narratives	with	which	 societies	 organise	 space	 and	 time	 and	 “the	 opening	 in	
which	it	is	hold,”	invariably	culminates	in	an	over-arching	theologico-political	narrative.	The	
over-arching	theologico-political	narrative	structures,	organises	and	secures	the	opening	in	
which	 societies	 are	 held.	 Now,	 it	 is	 this	 opening,	 the	 very	 opening	 of	 this	 opening,	 that	
suddenly	looms	large	again	when	refugee	status	commences.	It	suddenly	looms	large	because	
of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 commencement	 of	 refugee	 status	 undoes	 the	 organisation	 and	
securing	of	work	that	theologico-political	narratives	do.	It	is	of	course	a	tragic	and	devastating	
irony	that	this	stripping	is	frequently,	if	not	invariably,	precipitated	in	the	first	place	by	the	
crudest	of	theologico-political	narratives.	Be	it	as	it	may,	it	is	with	due	regard	to	this	naked	
opening	of	the	opening	that	one	begins	to	grasp	the	depth	and	width	of	the	hiatus	of	refugee	
status.	It	entails	nothing	less	than	the	gaping	emergence	of	bare	existence	for	which	there	is	
no	longer,	and	not	yet,	an	integrating	narrative.	The	hiatus	becomes	manifest	when	linguistic-
political	and	theologico-political	narratives	no	longer	facilitate	the	self-localisation	and	self-
densification	that	schematises	time,	space	and	selfhood.	
	
I	have	followed	aspects	of	Sigwart’s	fine	engagement	with	Arendt’s	thought	meticulously	for	
purposes	of	co-opting	it	for	a	description	of	the	radical	de-familiarisation	that	ultimately	leads	
to	the	hiatus	of	refugee	status.	This	co-option	can	of	course	only	become	productive	when	
one	reverses	the	progression	of	the	political	epistemology	that	is	of	concern	here.	For	this	
purpose,	one	needs	to	read	Sigwart’s	exposition	of	Arendt’s	political	epistemology	backwards	
and	against	its	grain.	Sigwart	describes	the	process	of	familiarisation	through	which	the	world	
takes	form	according	to	Arendt.	A	description	of	the	process	of	de-familiarisation	that	leads	
to	refugee	status	must	therefore	reverse	the	trajectory	of	Arendt’s	epistemology	of	politics.	
One	must	begin	where	it	ends	and	from	there	proceed	to	its	point	of	departure,	so	to	speak.	
Sigwart	never	elucidates	or	announces	this	point	of	departure.	He	appears	to	accept	that	one,	
everyone,	is	always	already	taken	up	in	the	process	of	narrative	integration,	always	swimming	
along	midstream	in	Gadamer’s	process	of	Einrücken.	This	is	of	course	not	surprising,	given	the	
way	in	which	hermeneutic	philosophy	is	keen	to	stress	the	inescapability	or	universality	of	the	
“hermeneutic	 situation.”18	 This	 “universality	 of	 the	 hermeneutic	 situation,”	 however,	
becomes	 markedly	 less	 self-evident	 and	 less	 significant	 when	 someone	 sets	 out	 on	 the	
trajectory	that	ends	in	refugee	status.	Is	it	an	exaggeration	to	say	that	the	inception	of	refugee	
status	concerns	an	evaporation	of	hermeneutic	status?	I	would	like	to	suggest	it	is	not;	in	any	
case,	not	if	one	takes	care	not	to	surreptitiously	reduce	hermeneutic	status	again	to	nothing	
more	 than	 the	 non-narrative	 and	 ahistorical	 capacity	 of	 the	 abstract	 Kantian	 subject	 to	
integrate	time	and	space.		
	
Now,	if	this	suggestion	holds	water,	if	it	is	correct	to	say	the	inception	of	refugee	status	entails	
the	 evaporation	 of	 hermeneutic	 status,	 it	 would	 compel	 one	 to	 observe	 that	 an	 incisive	
inquiry	 into	 refugee	 status	 demands	 a	 fundamental	 reversal	 of	 the	 intrinsic	 trajectory	 of	
Gadamerian	hermeneutics.	At	stake	for	any	attempt	to	move	in	the	direction	of	the	hiatus	of	
refugee	status,	is	not	a	process	of	Einrücken,	but	of	Ausrücken,	a	process	of	“setting	out”	in	
																																																						
17	Claude	Lefort,	“Permanence	du	théologico-politique?”	in	Essais	sur	le	politique	(Paris:	Editions	du	Seuil,	
1986),	287:	“Que	la	société	humaine	n’ait	une	ouverture	sur	elle-même	que	prise	dans	une	ouverture	qu’elle	
ne	fait	pas….”		
18	Gadamer,	Kleine	Schriften	I,	Tübingen:	Mohr	(Siebeck),	1967,	xx.	
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the	most	radical	sense	of	the	phrase	“setting	out.”	Of	concern,	here,	is	the	process	of	leaving	
and	leaving	behind	everything	that	a	hermeneutic	process	of	Einrücken	may	have	assembled	
in	a	former	time,	a	former	time	that	ended	precisely	when	this	Ausrücken	began.	Ausrücken	
severs	the	very	sequence	and	flow	of	time.	“In	a	crack	in	our	old	wall,	I	buried	my	intentions	
and	 left,	 writes	 Yousif	 M.	 Qasmiyeh	 about	 the	 last	 moment	 before	 setting	 off	 into	 the	
unknown	 and	 unfamiliar.19	 It	 is	 the	 narrative	 schematising	 of	 time	 and	 space	 itself	 that	
shatters	 when	 Ausrücken	 leaves	 behind	 the	 essential	 elements	 of	 one’s	 intentionality.	 A	
veritable	phenomenological	exercise	commences	when	one	leaves	one’s	intentions	behind	in	
the	crack	of	an	old	wall,	as	we	shall	see	closer	to	the	end	of	this	paper.	One	enters	another	
crack,	the	crack	in	time	and	space	where	things	have	yet	to	appear	again,	as	if	for	the	first	
time.	
	
Sigwart	 justifiably	 focuses	 on	 the	 “forward-looking”	 trajectory	 of	 Einrücken	 and	 world-
creating	hermeneutics	in	Arendt’s	work.	This	is	surely	the	dominant	trajectory	of	her	work.	
However,	if	this	were	the	only	operative	trajectory	in	her	work,	one	would	have	to	conclude	
that	Arendt	can	ultimately	tell	us	very	little	of	the	refugee	status	that	she	invokes	with	such	
force	in	her	essay	“We	refugees.”	Anyone	who	would	like	to	rely	on	Arendt’s	own	work	to	
come	to	an	incisive	understanding	of	her	essay	“We	Refugees”	would	therefore	have	to	ask	
whether	there	is	a	different	–	perhaps	less	visible,	but	significant	enough	–	aspect	of	her	work	
that	 effectively	 “turns	 around.”	 Is	 there	 an	 aspect	 of	 her	work	 that	 turns	 away	 from	 the	
trajectory	of	Einrücken,	so	as	to	mark	the	opposite	trajectory	of	Ausrücken?	
	
The	remarkable	passage	from	On	Revolution	already	quoted	in	the	Introduction	above	would	
suggest	that	this	is	indeed	the	case.	The	passage	invokes	a	hiatus	between	times,	a	break	in	
time	that	allows	for	an	interim	manifestation	of	a	“time”	before	or	after	time,	a	time	outside	
time	that	is	perhaps	better	portrayed	as	timelessness.	Indeed,	the	passage	appears	to	invoke	
a	 veritable	 timelessness	 that	 interrupts	 the	 times	 that	 emerge	 from	 the	 schematising	
integration	of	time	and	space	performed	by	world-creating	hermeneutics.	 It	describes	this	
timelessness	that	precedes	and	succeeds	time,	quite	remarkably,	exactly	with	reference	to	
aimless	migrations	of	persons	or	peoples	after	the	demise	of	one	world	and	before	the	rise	
of	another.		Arendt	writes:	
	
“With	respect	to	revolution,	these	tales	...	insist	on	a	hiatus	between	the	end	of	the	old	order	and	the	beginning	
of	the	new,	whether	it	is	of	no	great	importance	in	this	context	whether	the	hiatus	is	being	filled	by	the	desolate	
aimless	wanderings	of	 Israeli	 tribes	 in	 the	wilderness	or	by	the	adventures	and	dangers	which	befell	Aeneas	
before	he	reached	the	 Italian	shore....	 [T]his	hiatus	obviously	creeps	 into	all	 time	speculations	which	deviate	
from	the	currently	accepted	notion	of	time	as	a	continuous	flow;	it	was	therefore	an	almost	natural	object	of	
human	imagination	and	speculation,	in	so	far	as	these	touched	the	problem	of	beginning	at	all...”20	
	
Revolutions,	I	argue	elsewhere,	actually	have	little	to	do	with	the	hiatus	to	which	Arendt	links	
them	here.	 It	 is	 rather	 towards	 renegade	moments	 that	precede,	and	possibly	precipitate	
revolutions	–	they	can	also	fail	to	do	so	–	to	which	the	thinking	of	the	hiatus	should	lean.	It	is	
in	 the	 renegade	 that	we	 find	 someone	who	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 refugee.	Perhaps	 the	
refugee	is,	in	the	final	analysis,	a	renegade,	and	vice	versa.	It	is	in	the	figure	of	the	renegade	
																																																						
19	Yousif	M.	Qasmiyeh,	“The	Crack	also	Invites,”	held	in	the	private	collection	of	Lyndsey	Stonebridge,	and	also	
quoted	by	her	in	a	most	profound	paper	“We,	the	Refugees:	Hannah	Arendt	in	Baddawi,”	presented	in	Berlin	
at	Zentrum	für	Literatur-	und	Kulturforschung,	15	March	2018.	
20	Arendt,	On	Revolution,	205.	
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–	a	figure	that	no	longer	enjoys	the	comfort	of	a	stable	persona	(and	has	to	take	on	makeshift	
personas	like	Bram	Fischer)	–	that	we	find	the	one	who	is	uprooted	from	all	worlds,	the	one	
who	 has	 traversed	 the	 most	 complete	 process	 of	 de-familiarisation	 that	 life	 can	 sustain	
without	sinking	back	into	lifeless	matter.	One	would	go	much	too	fast	if	one	would	also	link	
the	renegade	and	the	refugee	to	the	musulman	on	which	Agamben	reflects	in	Remnants	of	
Auschwitz,	but	making	some	links	may	well	be	warranted	on	another	occasion.21	The	refugee	
is	in	most	cases	not	yet	the	walking	dead	that	is	the	musulman,	but	she	is	the	walking	hiatus	
and	the	difference	between	the	two	may	be	less	knowable	than	we	think.	(24	minutes)	
	
II.	RESISTANCE	TO	RE-FAMILIARISATION		
	
The	refugee	has	fallen	into,	or	has	become,	the	hiatus.	From	here,	from	where	she	is	and	from	
whom	 (or	what?)	 she	has	become,	 she	 faces	 the	ordeal	of	 a	double	 resistance	 to	any	 re-
familiarisation	 that	 may	 restore	 a	 world	 for	 her,	 her	 own	 resistance,	 and	 the	 world’s	
resistance.	First,	her	own	resistance:	Clawing	her	way	back	means	entering	the	ordeal	of	re-
familiarisation	 with	 unfamiliar	 soil	 and	 air;	 re-familiarisation	 that	 is,	 in	 fact,	 not	 strictly	
speaking	 a	 re-familiarisation,	 but	 a	 totally	 new	 familiarisation.	 It	 concerns	 a	 first	
familiarisation	with	unfamiliar	organisations	of	soil	and	air,	unfamiliar	schemas	of	time	and	
space.	 	 Clawing	her	way	back	 requires	 accepting	 as	 her	 own	 the	hard	density	 of	 an	 alien	
reality,	the	Wirklichkeitsdichte	of	others	that	meets	her	like	a	fence,	yet	another	fence.		It	is	
an	ordeal	with	abyssal	dimensions.	The	hiatus	 itself	–	the	break	 in	time	in	which	she	finds	
herself	–	is	nothing	but	the	thinnest	of	air,	but	it	is	still	closer	the	world	left	behind	than	the	
one	she	is	compelled	to	enter.	The	first	step	into	this	new	world	is	one	more	step	away	from	
the	 world	 left	 behind.	 The	 first	 step	 of	 re-familiarisation	 is	 yet	 another	 step	 of	 de-
familiarisation.	
	
There	 is	 absolutely	 no	 reason	 to	 expect	 that	 the	 process	 of	 re-familiarisation	 would	 and	
should	 be	 embraced	 with	 optimism,	 enthusiasm,	 let	 alone	 joy.	 Any	 such	 optimism,	
enthusiasm	or	joy	would	be	bizarre	in	the	case	of	one	who	has	lost	everything	except	bare	
existence.	Yes,	Arendt	does	refer	to	the	“optimism”	of	refugees	in	“We	refugees”:	
	
“We	wanted	to	rebuild	our	lives,	that	was	all.	In	order	to	rebuild	one’s	life	one	has	to	be	strong,	and	an	optimist.	
So	we	are	very	optimistic.”22	
	
Less	than	half	a	page	down	she	begins	to	ridicule	this	optimism:	
	
We	were	told	to	 forget;	and	we	forgot	quicker	than	anybody	could	ever	 imagine.	 In	a	 friendly	way	we	were	
reminded	that	the	new	country	would	become	our	new	home.	And	after	four	weeks	in	France,	or	six	weeks	in	
America,	we	pretended	to	be	Frenchmen	or	Americans.	The	more	optimistic	among	us	would	even	add	that	
their	whole	former	life	had	been	passed	in	a	kind	of	unconscious	exile	and	only	their	new	country	now	taught	
them	what	a	home	really	looks	like	….	With	the	language	…	we	find	no	difficulties;	after	a	single	year	optimists	
are	convinced	they	speak	English	as	well	as	their	mother	tongue.	And	after	two	years	they	swear	solemnly	that	
they	speak	English	better	than	any	other	language	–	their	German	is	a	language	they	hardly	remember.23	
	
																																																						
21	See	Agamben,	Remnants	of	Auschwitz,	New	York:	Zone	Books,	1999,	41-86.	
22	Arendt,	“We	refugees,”	110.	
23	Arendt,	“We	refugees,”	111.	
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Two	pages	down	the	truth	about	this	optimism	would	come	out:	It	is	“insane”	and	“next	door	
to	despair.”24	The	truth	of	their	refugee	status	came	to	them	in	the	camp	of	Gurs.	There	she	
“heard	only	about	suicide.”	Suicide	was	even	considered	“a	collective	action”	and	it	ultimately	
took	 “a	 violent	 courage	of	 life”	 to	overcome	 the	 allure	of	 suicide.	And	 from	what	Arednt	
writes,	it	is	quite	clear	that	this	“violent	courage	of	life”	actually	pivoted	on	a	kind	of	suicide,	
namely,	the	acceptance	that	personal	life	and	expectations	had	to	be	ignored.	They	had	been	
taken	over	by	bigger	things:	
	
The	general	opinion	held	that	one	would	have	to	be	abnormally	asocial	and	unconcerned	by	general	events	if	
one	was	still	able	to	interpret	the	whole	accident	as	personal	and	individual	bad	luck	and,	accordingly,	ended	
one’s	life	personally	and	individually.25	
	
The	paradox	is	clear.	To	liven	on	as	a	person,	in	order	not	to	end	one’s	life	“personally	and	
individually,”	the	refugees	in	Gurs	had	to	suspend	and	forget	their	personal	lives.	The	dialectic	
between	private	and	public	life	that	Arendt	described	so	confidently	in	The	Human	Condition	
evidently	 failed	 here.	 Whatever	 “public	 spirit”	 remained	 possible	 here,	 could	 only	 be	
sustained	by	a	suicide	of	the	person,	even	if	this	suicide	was	not	physical	suicide.26	
	
Arendt’s	reflections	on	the	mental	states	of	mind	of	refugees	testify	to	the	reality	that	one	
cannot	sincerely	and	realistically	expect	any	consistent	optimism	among	refugees	who	wait	
in	utter	uncertainty	to	begin	with	life	again,	to	begin	at	the	very	beginning,	by	taking	leave	of	
everything	 that	 life	 was	 until	 “the	 whole	 accident”	 occurred.	 Under	 these	 circumstances	
consistent	optimism,	optimism	that	is	not	the	“next	door”	neighbour	of	despair,	would	only	
signal	a	 lack	of	 real	 refugee	status.	 It	would	be	 the	sign	 instead,	of	 the	wanderlust	of	 the	
wayfarer,	adventurer	or	wanderer	for	whom	the	world	left	behind	is	not	truly	lost;	it	would	
be	 the	 sign	of	 one	 that	 is	 still	 relatively	 closely	 related	 to	 the	public	 figure	who	 ventures	
courageously	 into	 the	 world	 with	 the	 comforting	 knowledge	 that	 his	 home	 is	 intact	 and	
waiting	upon	him;	the	public	figure	of	whom	one	of	the	most	significant	passages	in	Arendt’s	
whole	oeuvre	speaks.27	 It	 is	 this	wanderer	that	Sigwart’s	rendition	of	Arendt’s	“wandering	
thought”	 contemplates	 almost	 throughout	 his	 book	 (surprisingly	 without	 citing	 this	 key	
passage).	Almost.	There	is	an	exceptional	page	to	which	we’ll	return	towards	the	end	of	this	
paper.	And	we	will	return	to	it	in	order	to	look	for	answers	to	the	following	constellation	of	
questions:	
	
What	can	one	come	to	know	of	the	one	who	cannot	speak	for	and	from	stable	and	secure	
selfhood?	 How	 shall	 we	 assess	 the	 courage	 of	 one	 whose	 virtue	 is	 not	 reflected	 in	 the	
eloquent	 and	profound	public	 appearance	of	 those	who	 venture	out	 from	 secure	homes,	
knowing	that	they	can	return	to	them	after	the	performance?	How	shall	we	admire	or	at	least	
respect	the	superhuman	endurance	and	persistence	of	the	one	who	has	to	claw	her	way	back	
																																																						
24	Arendt,	“We	refugees,”	113.	
25	Arendt,	“We	refugees,”	113.	
26	Perhaps	it	was	the	real	and	traumatic	experience	of	the	breakdown	of	this	dialectic	that	inspired	Arendt	to	
articulate	it	so	expressly	in	The	Human	Condition.	See	in	this	regard	Sigrid	Weigel	“The	Initial	point	of	Arendt’s	
political	anthropology,”	paper	presented	in	Berlin	at	the	Zentrum	für	Literatur-	und	Kulturforschung,	15	March	
2018.	
27	Arendt,	The	Human	condition.	For	a	further	engagement	with	the	significance	of	this	passage,	see	Van	der	
Walt	“Law	and	the	Space	of	Appearance	in	Arendt’s	Thought”	in	Goldini	and	McCorkindale	(eds)	Hannah	
Arendt	and	the	Law,	Hart	Publishing,	Oxford,	63	–	88.	
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from	gaping	nothingness?	How	shall	one	desire	her?	How	shall	one	embrace	the	bearer	of	
this	inhuman	endurance	when	she	no	longer	offers	substance	to	an	embrace,	when	she	has	
lost	and	not	yet	regained	the	density	of	selfhood	that	the	self	draws	from	the	density	of	an	
adequately	 interpreted	world?	Where	 shall	one	 find	 the	 self	 for	whom	the	notion	of	 self-
localisation	remains	a	fiction	until	such	time	as	it	has	passed	through	an	act	comparable	to	
suicide,	passed	through	the	 last	act	of	de-localisation	without	which	re-localisation	cannot	
commence?	How	shall	one	register	 the	shallow	breathing	of	 this	 living	hiatus,	 the	shallow	
breath	of	breaking	and	broken	time?	
	
Who	will	recount	what	happens	when	time	breaks?	And	what	account	can	be	given	of	this	
break?	These	are	the	questions	to	which	we	shall	return	below.	Suffice	it	to	imagine	for	now	
the	almost	insurmountable	resistance	to	re-familiarisation	that	inhibits	the	transcendence	of	
refugee	status	and	 the	passage	 to	a	new	world.	 If	 this	 resistance	could	be	 imagined	 for	a	
moment,	many	 other	 phenomena	 associated	with	 refugee	 and	 “immigrant”	 status	would	
become	 comprehensible	 in	 a	way	 that	 they	may	well	 not	 become	 otherwise.	We	 cannot	
interrogate	here	 the	highly	unstable	 and	 frequently	 fictitious	distinction	between	 refugee	
status,	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	different	kind	of	“immigrant”	status	on	the	other,	a	distinction	
that	 is	 often	 presented	 as	 one	 between	 “real	 refugees”	 and	 “economic	 refugees.”	 Let	 us	
simply	take	a	cue	from	a	typical	variety	of	societal	malaise	frequently	associated	with	both,	
namely,	the	unwillingness	and	inability	to	“integrate	socially.”	This	malaise	is	of	course	almost	
always	 effectively	 complemented	 by	 an	 inability	 and	 unwillingness	 to	 allow	 and	 facilitate	
social	integration	from	“the	other	side”	of	this	abyssal	gap.	We	shall	turn	to	this	“other	side	
of	the	coin”	in	a	moment.	Before	we	do	so,	let	us	first	take	proper	leave	of	“this	side	of	the	
coin”	with	this	question:	Is	the	extent	to	which	refugees	resist	social	integration	(whatever	
this	might	mean:	unwillingness	to	adopt	local	language	and	culture,	delinquency,	etc.)	not	a	
last	 desperate	 act	 of	 resistance	 to	 the	 semi-suicidal	 self-denial	 that	 ultimately	 conditions	
functional	adaptation	to	an	alien	cultural	and	social	environment?	
	
Let	us	turn	to	the	other	side	of	the	coin,	now,	by	observing	that	even	eviscerated	spectres	
continue	 to	 haunt.	 In	 fact,	especially	 they	 or	only	 they	 continue	 to	 haunt.	 A	 new	 spectre	
appears	to	haunt	Europe,	one	could	and	should	well	say,	with	reference	to	both	Marx	and	
Derrida.28	It	threatens	to	contaminate	Europe	with	the	condition	of	the	hiatus.	It	threatens	to	
turn	Europe	into	a	veritable	disintegrating	clan	of	exorcists	for	whom	“ever	closer	union”	has	
come	to	take	the	form	of	some	progress	towards	greater	consensus	regarding	refugee	quotas.	
“The	comity	of	European	peoples	went	to	pieces	when,	and	because,	it	allowed	its	weakest	
member	 to	 be	 excluded	 and	 persecuted,”	 wrote	 Arendt	 in	 “We	 refugees.”	 One	 should	
rephrase:	The	comity	of	European	peoples	went	to	pieces	because	of	its	apocalyptic	inability	
to	 recognise	 one	 of	 its	 members	 as	 a	 member.	 It	 is	 of	 course	 too	 early	 to	 say	 whether	
apocalypse	is	again	in	the	offing,	but	it	is	fair	to	observe	that	an	already	catastrophic	inability	
to	 recognise	 a	member	 as	 a	member	 is	 again	 signalling	 the	 real	 possibility	 that	 a	 certain	
Europe	 is	 coming	 to	 an	 end.	What	 may	 remain	 of	 “Europe”	 after	 this	 end,	 may	 well	 be	
unrecognisable	to	itself.	Europe’s	time	may	well	be	breaking,	as	it	has	done	so	often	before.	
And	 that	 which	may	 come	 after	 this	 break	may	well	 be	 incomparable	 to	 that	 which	 has	
preceded	it.	
	
																																																						
28	See	Jacques	Derrida,	Spectres	de	Marx,	Paris:	Éditions	Galilée,	1993.	
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But	why	are	we	talking	about	the	inability	to	recognise	a	member	as	a	member	against	the	
background	 of	 the	 current	 refugee	 crisis	 in	 Europe?	 Are	 the	 refugees	 who	 have	 crossed	
Europe’s	borders	in	recent	months	and	years	not	foreigners?	Are	they	not	non-members	in	
the	most	reliable	sense	of	the	word	“non-member”?	Do	they	not	come	from	foreign	countries	
with	the	most	“non-European”	ways	of	life	conceivable?	Well,	that	is	not	what	international	
law	tells	us.	This	is	not	what	European	international	law	tells	us,	for	one	should	frankly	admit	
that	the	international	law	of	concern	here	is	essentially	European	law,	law	that	is	based	on	
principles	of	civilisation	–	both	secular	and	religious	–	that	are	essentially	of	European	origin.	
And	 this	 European	 international	 law,	 argues	 Ayten	 Gündoğdu	 in	 an	 exquisite	 recent	
monograph	 on	 Arendt	 and	 international	 law,	 not	 only	 erases	 the	 difference	 between	
European	and	non-European	citizenship,	it	also	erases	the	distinction	between	citizenship	and	
non-citizenship	 as	 such.	 It	 proclaims,	 in	 other	 words,	 universal	 membership	 in	 a	 legal	
community	that	is	essentially	a	European	legal	community.	
	
Let	us	begin	with	Gündoğdu’s	critical	rereading	of	Arendt’s	work	against	the	background	of	a	
universal	rights	culture	that	was	not	yet	established	at	the	time	Arendt	published	her	forceful	
and	enigmatic	critique	of	human	rights	in	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism	 in	1949.	What	has	
changed	in	the	course	of	the	seven	decades	that	have	passed	since	1949	that	may	require	a	
reassessment	of	this	critique?	Gündoğdu	responds	to	this	question	against	the	background	of	
key	 developments	 of	 international	 law	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century.	 She	begins	her	discussion	of	 this	 development	by	noting	how	Arendt	 considered	
human	rights	a	“stepchild	 [of]	nineteenth	century	political	 thought”	that	no	political	party	
took	seriously	then	and	was	still	not	being	taken	seriously	almost	fifty	years	into	the	twentieth	
century.	Humanitarian	 concerns	with	 violations	 of	 human	dignity	were	 still	 limited	 to	 the	
engagements	 of	 “professional	 idealists	 …	 and	 philanthropists”	 and	 “international	 jurists	
without	political	experience,”	wrote	Arendt	in	1949,	a	year	after	the	Universal	Declaration	of	
Human	rights	was	adopted	by	the	United	Nations.	The	scope	and	effect	of	these	concerns,	
she	claimed,	remained	negligible	as	a	result	of	a	state-centric	framework	of	internal	law	that	
guaranteed	no	protection	beyond	the	protection	of	constitutional	rights	of	citizens.29		
	
It	 is	 against	 the	 background	 of	 this	 framework	 of	 international	 law	 that	 The	 Origins	 of	
Totalitarianism	put	forward	the	enigmatic	concept	of	“a	right	to	have	rights.”30	In	an	essay	
published	almost	a	year	after	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UNDHR),	Arendt	
still	 bemoaned	 “the	 lack	of	 reality”	 of	 the	 rights	 articulated	 in	 the	Declaration.	 The	essay	
nevertheless	 acknowledged	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 “a	 crime	 against	 humanity”	
invoked	 by	 Justice	 Jackson	 during	 the	 Nuremberg	 trials.31	 Arendt	 recognised	 the	 right	 to	
asylum	as	the	only	significant	“symbol	of	the	rights	of	man”	in	international	law	in	The	Origin	
of	Totalitarianism,	but	contended	that	this	symbol	had	practically	been	abolished	because	of	
the	 pressures	 of	 massive	 statelessness	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 and	 the	
uncodified	status	of	this	right	in	both	international	treaties	and	national	constitutions.		The	
right	 to	asylum	accordingly	enjoyed	 little	more	 than	a	 “shadowy	existence”	 that	 could	be	
invoked	in	“exceptional	cases.”	It	warranted	no	general	institutional	protection.32	
																																																						
29	See	Ayten	Gündoğdu,	Rightlessness	in	an	Age	of	Rights.	Hannah	Arendt	and	the	Contemporary	Struggles	of	
Migrants,	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press:	2015,	6.	
30	Gündoğdu,	6,	referring	to	Arendt,	The	Origin	of	Totalitarianism,	298.	
31	Gündoğdu,	6-7,	referring	to	Arendt,	“‘The	Rights	of	Man’:	What	are	they?”	Modern	Review	3	(1)	1949,	36-37.	
32	Gündoğdu,	8,	referring	to	Arendt,	The	Origin	of	Totalitarianism,	280-281.	
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Things	 nevertheless	 started	 to	 change	 significantly	 after	 1948	 in	 ways	 that	 Arendt	 never	
seemed	to	credit	with	due	significance,	argues	Gündoğdu.	Article	14	of	the	UNDHR	already	
codified	the	right	to	asylum.	The	1951	Geneve	Convention	on	the	Status	of	Refugees	and	its	
1967	Protocol	stipulated	more	extensive	rights	for	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	Article	15	of	
the	 UNDHR	 addressed	 the	 central	 problem	 of	 statelessness	 that	 Arendt	 raised	 in	 OT	 by	
prohibiting	 states	 from	 either	 depriving	 citizens	 of	 nationality	 or	 denying	 their	 rights	 to	
change	their	nationality.	In	addition	to	this,	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	
Rights	(ICCPR)	“requires	states	to	grant	all	 individuals	who	reside	within	their	territory	and	
subject	within	their	jurisdiction	a	set	of	rights	‘without	distinction	of	any	kind	such	as	race,	
colour,	sex,	language,	religion,	political	or	other	opinion,	national	or	social	origin,	property,	
birth	 or	 other	 status”	 (Art2.1	 ICCPR).33	 Gündoğdu	 observes	 in	 this	 regard	 the	 opinion	 of	
several	 commentators	 that	 the	 ICCPR	 renders	 the	 distinction	 between	 citizens	 and	 non-
citizens	insignificant	from	a	basic	rights	perspective.	Further	to	this,	article	26	of	the	ICCPR	
provides	 for	 equality	before	 the	 law	and	equal	protection	of	 the	 law	of	 citizens	and	non-
citizens	in	a	way	that	basically	seem	to	render	obsolete	the	“dispossession	of	personhood”	
and	“rightlessness”	that	were	central	to	Arendt’s	analyses	in	the	The	Origin	of	Totalitarianism.	
	
The	 list	 is	 not	 exhaustive,	 but	 it	 accounts	 for	 the	 major	 developments	 of	 human	 rights	
protections	in	international	law	since	Arendt’s	analysis	of	the	lack	of	these	protections	with	
reference	to	statelessness,	observes	Gündoğdu,	and	one	must	agree	with	her	that	it	surely	
calls	for	the	new	assessment	of	the	relevance	or	Arendt’s	assessments	of	these	concerns.	How	
might	one	 still	 attribute	 significance	 to	Arendt’s	 scepticism	 regarding	human	 rights	 in	The	
Origin	of	Totalitarianism	in	view	of	the	extensive	codification	of	international	human	rights	
law	in	the	course	of	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century?	
	
Gündoğdu	response	to	this	question	is	not	the	one	the	international	lawyers	would	expect.	It	
may	well	be,	 she	 contends,	 that	 the	extensive	 codification	of	human	 rights	protections	 in	
contemporary	international	law	has	in	many	respects	rendered	human	rights	violations	less,	
rather	than	more	visible.	Confidence	in	readily	available	positive	legal	protections	may	well	
have	induced	a	certain	complacency	with	regard	to	the	myriad	of	ways	in	which	the	actual	
protection	of	human	rights	often	fall	dismally	short	of	the	promise	that	positive	law	appears	
to	warrant.	Gündoğdu	refers	to	striking	observations	of	Yasemin	Soysal	and	Seyla	Benhabib	
in	this	regard.	Soysal	writes:	
	
“[R]ights	provided	to	migrants	by	the	international	human	rights	framework	can	be	contested	and	undermined	
by	 various	 sets	 of	 economic	 and	 factors	 …	 These	 problems	 arise	 due	 to	 “an	 ‘implementation	 deficit,’	 a	
discrepancy	between	formal	rights	and	their	praxis.”34	
	
Benhabib	echoes	Soysal’s	observations	with	a	selection	of	metaphors	that	leads	one	straight	
to	 the	 precipice	 of	 the	 gaping	 non-recognition	 that	 has	 permeated	 the	 inner	 recesses	 of	
confident	human	rights	discourses	and	the	international	comity	of	peoples	that	they	promise.	
She	writes:	
	
																																																						
33	Gündoğdu,	9.	
34	Gündoğdu,	10,	quoting	Yasemin	Nuhoğlu	Soysal,	Limits	of	Citizenship:	Migrants	and	Postnational	
Membership	in	Europe,	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1994,	134.	
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“These	groups	exist	at	the	limits	of	all	rights	regimes	and	reveal	the	blind	spot	in	the	system	of	rights,	where	the	
rule	of	law	flows	into	its	opposite:	the	state	of	exception	and	the	ever-present	danger	of	violence.”35	
	
There	is	an	Agambian	flavour	in	this	sentence	to	which	we	shall	return	below.	Suffice	it	to	
observe	 for	now	how	the	norm/practice	contradiction	 in	 international	 law	that	Gündoğdu	
brings	to	the	fore	here,	gives	one	adequate	reason	for	arguing	that	the	current	refugee	crisis	
in	Europe	pivots	in	many	respects	on	the	failure	“to	recognise	members	as	members”	invoked	
above.	Whether	one	is	really	confronted	with	a	failure	to	recognise	a	member	as	a	member,	
or	 rather	 the	 “exclusion	of	 [a]	member”	 that	 the	 last	 lines	of	 “We	Refugees”	 invoke,	 is	 a	
question	that	will	stay	with	us	until	 the	end	of	this	paper.	 I	shall	ultimately	 insist	that	 it	 is	
indeed	a	case	of	non-recognition	that	is	at	stake	here,	for	reasons	that	I	will	articulate	then.	
From	a	 strictly	practical	or	 legal	perspective,	however,	 the	question	 is	ultimately	not	 that	
important.	 It	 is	evident	 that	 international	 law	 is	not	doing	what	 it	claims	to	be	doing.	 It	 is	
either	not	recognising	all	members	of	the	global	comity	of	peoples	as	members,	as	it	says	it	
is,	 or	 it	 is	 excluding	 some	members	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	 recognised	 as	
members.	
	
This	norm-practice	contradiction	 in	 international	 law	reflects	 the	other	 side	of	 the	double	
resistance	to	re-familiarisation	that	renders	an	effective	and	incisive	release	from	the	hiatus	
of	refugee	status	so	deeply	problematic	and	highly	unlikely.	The	refugee	not	only	needs	to	
overcome	 her	 own	 existential	 resistance	 to	 re-familiarisation.	 She	 must	 also	 overcome	
existential	resistance	of	local	citizens	against	this	re-familiarisation.	
	
I	have	pirated	Gündoğdu’s	arguments	at	length	now	and	need	to	get	back	to	the	thread	of	my	
argument.	 I	 nevertheless	wish	 to	 put	 up	 for	 reflection	one	more	 key	 contention	 that	 she	
makes.	Is	there	any	further	use	of	Arendt’s	enigmatic	invocation	of	“the	right	to	have	rights”	
against	 the	background	of	pervasive	positive	human	 rights	 law	 that	 is	belied	by	pervasive	
failures	 of	 human	 rights	 protection?	 Does	 an	 Arendtian	 insistence	 to	 supplement	 the	
pervasive	positive	system	of	primary	rights	with	an	additional	right	–	a	kind	of	meta-right	or	
primary-primary	right	–	make	any	sense	against	the	background	the	massive	failure	of	primary	
rights	that	Soysal	and	Benhabib	and	many	others	bring	to	our	attention?		Gündoğdu	believes	
it	 indeed	 makes	 continuing	 sense	 to	 sustain	 this	 enigmatic	 supplementation.	 The	
supplementation,	she	claims,	can	serve	as	a	denotation	of	a	set	of	practices	through	which	
the	dormant	recognition	of	human	rights	in	international	law	can	be	activated.	She	cunningly	
invokes	in	this	regard	the	performativity	on	which	all	natural	or	basic	right	norms	turn,	that	
Arendt	invokes	in	On	Revolution.	She	indeed	makes	a	most	pertinent	point	here,	one	which	
resonates	 significantly	 with	 the	 performativity	 on	 which	 Hans	 Kelsen’s	 supposedly	 “pure	
theory	of	law”	ultimately	depends,	as	I	argue	elsewhere.36	The	performativity	that	she	brings	
into	 contention	 here	 nevertheless	 falls	 significantly	 short	 of	 the	 more	 fundamental	
performativity	that	I	wish	to	bring	to	bear	on	the	hiatus	of	refugee	status.	It	is	this	deeper	
performativity	that	I	wish	to	approach	with	the	constellation	of	questions	announced	above.	
To	restate	those	questions	in	a	nutshell:	Who	will	come	to	recognise	the	refugee	and	how	will	
																																																						
35	Gündoğdu	,	11,	quoting	Benhabib,	The	Rights	of	Others:	Aliens,	Residents	and	Citizens,	Cambridge/New	York:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2004,	163.	
36	Van	der	Walt,	“Law,	Utopia,	Event:	A	Constellation	of	Two	Trajectories”	in	Austin	Sarat	et	al,	(eds)	Law	and	
the	Utopian	Imagination,	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2014,	60	–	100.	
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this	recognition	take	place.	Who	can	give	account	of	the	hiatus,	and	how	can	this	account	be	
recounted?	Perhaps	we	are	ready	to	turn	to	this	question	now.	
	
III.	RECOGNISING	THE	HIATUS	
	
The	 extensive	 engagement	 above	with	 Sigwart’s	 and	Gündoğdu’s	 fine	 readings	 of	 Arendt	
seeks	to	extract	from	them	a	key	insight.	At	stake	in	their	work	is,	respectively,	two	concerns:	
1)	an	explanation	and	exposition	of	the	schematising	functions	with	which	twentieth	century	
philosophy	 of	 language	 replaced	 and/or	 supplemented	 Kant’s	 transcendental	
Schematismuslehre	with	the	world-integrating	function	of	language	and	narrative	(Sigwart),	
and	2),	an	inquiry	into	the	way	in	which	a	significant	portion	of	this	narrative	and	linguistic	
integration	of	the	world,	human	rights	discourses,	appear	to	fail	(Gündoğdu).	
	
Language	and	narrative	–	“stories”	and	a	“talkative	and	argumentative	interest	in	the	world,”	
as	Sigwart	puts	it	–	are	today	widely	understood	to	execute	key	elements	of	the	integrating	
functions	that	Kant	attributed	to	the	performative	imagination	of	the	transcendental	subject	
of	knowledge.	To	put	 it	once	more	 in	the	terms	that	Sigwart	extracts	 from	Arendt’s	work:		
Language	 and	 narrative	 are	 widely	 understood	 today	 as	 the	 essential	 competences	 that	
render	“world-densification,”	“self-localisation”	and	“interpretive	integration	possible.”	They	
are	key	to	the	common	temporal	and	spatial	coordinates	–	common	space	and	time	–	that	
underpin	the	comprehensible	worlds	that	humans	share.	
	
This	 being	 the	 case,	 it	 is	 well	 advisable	 to	 check	 from	 time	 to	 time	 how	well	 the	world-
constituting	 narratives	 are	 performing	 the	 task	 of	 integration	 that	 twentieth	 century	
philosophy	 has	 entrusted	 to	 them,	 especially	 if	 there	 are	 clear	 signals	 in	 the	 air	 that	 this	
integration	is	not	panning	out	as	well	as	one	might	hope.	And	it	is	in	this	regard	that	Gündoğdu	
confronts	one	with	evidence	of	a	glaring	failure	of	essential	twentieth	century	political	and	
legal	discourses,	namely	human	rights	discourses,	to	perform	this	narrative	integration.	
I	have	allowed	this	plot	of	narrative	integration	and	disintegration	to	thicken,	above	(see	the	
end	of	Section	II)	by	also	linking	it	to	the	fundamental	“ordering	of	space	and	time”	that	Lefort	
invokes	when	 he	writes	 about	 the	 theologico-political	 narratives	 though	which	 European	
human	societies	hold	themselves	in	“an	opening	they	do	not	create.”	Lefort’s	famous	claim	is	
that	democracy	is	the	only	narrative	that	endeavoured	to	maintain	this	opening	“open”	or	
empty,	but	also	failed	to	do	so	in	the	end	by	resorting	to	a	deifying	narrative	of	the	state.	
During	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 this	 narrative	 deification	 of	 the	 state	 in	 Revolutionary	 and	
Enlightenment	discourses	was	replaced	by	a	conservative	Christian	human	rights	discourse,	
Samuel	Moyn	 tells	 us.37	 Putting	 all	 of	 this	 together,	 one	 can	 argue	 that	 the	discourses	 of	
international	 human	 rights	 law	 recount	 the	 theologico-juridical	 ordering	 of	 a	 common	
humanity	 with	 which	 twentieth	 century	 conservative	 Christian	 discourses	 replaced	 the	
theologico-political	 ordering	 of	 humanity	 of	Modernity	 symbolised	 by	 the	 Enlightenment	
discourse	of	the	French	revolution.	The	word	“symbolised”	is	not	employed	casually	here.	It	
																																																						
37	See	Samuel	Moyn,	Christian	Human	Rights,	Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2015,	9;	The	Last	
Utopia,	Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2012,	25	–	26.		
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invokes	the	fundamental	holding	together	(symbolein)	of	a	form	of	life	that	Lefort	attributes	
to	the	political	(le	politique	as	opposed	to	la	politique).38	
The	key	point	that	comes	to	the	fore	in	view	of	Gündoğdu’s	account	of	the	failure	of	human	
rights	discourses	to	live	up	to	their	promises	concerns	a	fundamental	failure	of	the	political	
(le	politique)	and	the	symbolic	 in	our	time.	This	point	can	be	unpacked	very	precisely	with	
reference	to	the	forceful	language	of	Benhabib	quoted	in	Gündoğdu’s	account:	1)	If	human	
rights	discourses	are	the	operation	–	the	becoming	operative	–	of	a	blind	spot,	as	Benhabib	
tells	us;	and	2),	 if	 this	blind	spot	performs	a	fundamental	obfuscation	of	a	critical	 junction	
“where	the	rule	of	law	flows	into	its	opposite:	the	state	of	exception	and	the	ever-present	
danger	of	violence,”	then,	3),	the	symbolic	holding	together	that	theologico-juridical	human	
rights	discourses	perform	evidently	consists	in	surreptitiously	sustaining	a	hiatus	that	splits	
humanity	instead	of	holding	it	together.	The	failure	of	hermeneutic	and	theologico-political	
or	theologico-juridical	integration	of	time	and	space	at	stake	here	culminates	in	nothing	less	
than	 a	 failure	 of	 the	 basic	 schematising	 function	 that	 Kant	 attributes	 to	 transcendental	
subjectivity.	If	the	space	of	the	rule	of	law	is	simultaneously	the	space	of	the	exception	and	
the	ever-present	danger	of	violence,	and	if	the	space	of	a	common	humanity	actually	remains	
the	space	of	a	divided	humanity,	the	very	spatial	and	temporal	coordinates	of	humanity	and	
the	 rule	 of	 law	 evidently	 get	 scrambled	 in	 a	 way	 that	 sucks	 everyone	 and	 everything	
concerned	 into	 a	 vortex	 devoid	 of	 space	 and	 time.	 The	 deep	 end	 of	 Arendt’s	 profound	
observation	at	the	end	of	“We	Refugees”	begins	to	meet	a	deeply	perplexed	gaze	here:	“The	
comity	 of	 European	 peoples	 went	 to	 pieces	 when,	 and	 because,	 it	 allowed	 its	 weakest	
member	to	be	excluded	and	persecuted.”	Once	fundamental	narratives	of	 integration	and	
inclusion	begin	to	allow	the	weakly	integrated	and	badly	included	to	drop	into	cracks	where	
the	narratives	simply	no	longer	apply	(or	turn	into	their	opposite),	the	authors	and	principal	
narrators	of	these	narratives	will	also	be	sucked	into	the	cracks	of	non-application.				
	
It	 is	 this	 abyssal	 narrative	 failure	 to	 which	 Gündoğdu’s	 invocation	 of	 the	 performative	
contradiction	of	human	rights	norms	alludes:	The	fundamental	performative	operation	that	
is	 really	 operative	 in	 international	 human	 rights	 law,	 is	 not	 the	 sustenance	 of	 a	 common	
humanity	through	human	rights	norms	and	discourses,	but	the	sustenance	of	a	divide	through	
the	sustenance	of	human	rights	discourses.	
	
Early	 in	 her	 book,	 Gündoğdu	 expressly	 dissociates	 her	 fine	 critique	 of	 Arendt	 and	 of	
international	 human	 rights	 discourses,	 from	 Giorgio	 Agamben’s	 complete	 retreat	 from	
human	 rights	 discourses.	 She	 opts	 for	 a	 continued	 “navigation	 and	 reworking	 of	 the	
perplexities	of	human	rights,”	instead	of	Agamben’s	pursuit	of	a	“nonstatal	and	nonjuridical	
politics	[of]	human	life.”39	However,	her	engagement	with	important	human	rights	case	law	
later	in	the	book	ultimately	compels	her	to	acknowledge	–	even	if	only	indirectly	–	the	force	
of	Agamben’s	description	of	migrants	as	homines	sacri,	that	is,	as	a	form	of	life	that	“ceases	
to	be	politically	relevant.”40		It	also	bears	mentioning	again	how	the	selection	of	metaphors	
to	which	Benhabib	 resorts	 to	describe	 the	deeper	 reality	of	 international	 law,	 intimates	a	
																																																						
38	See	Lefort,	“La	question	de	la	démocratie”	in	Lacoue-Labarthe,	P	and	Nancy,	J.L	(eds)	Le	Retrait	du	Politique,	
1983,	Paris:	Galilée,	71-88.		
39	Gündoğdu,	24.	
40	Gündoğdu,	116	
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veritable	Agambian	 regard	 for	 the	complex	way	 in	which	 the	 law	operates	by	means	of	a	
fundamental	exclusion	or	banning	of	sacred	life	(or	bare	life,	zoe)	from	political	life	(bios).41			
	
Gündoğdu’s	promiment	citation	of	these	metaphors	early	in	her	book	shows	that	she	is	not	
shying	away	from	the	deep	contradictions	and	paradoxes	of	human	rights	law.	She	ultimately	
opts	to	sustain	the	self-contradictory	theologico-juridical	symbolism	of	conservative	Christian	
human	 rights	 discourses	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 “navigat[ing]	 and	 reworking	 [their]	
perplexities.”	Hers	is	undoubtedly	a	complex,	admirable,	and	important	discourse	that	merits	
being	 taken	 as	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 all	 critical	 inquiries	 into	 the	 state	 of	 symbolical,	
hermeneutic,	theologico-political,	juridico-political	and	schematising	narratives	in	our	time.	It	
is,	however,	also	a	discourse	that	can	benefit	significantly	from	a	more	focused	engagement	
with	the	phenomenological	tradition	of	critical	inquiry	that	she	herself	invokes	to	characterise	
Arendt’s	 theoretical	 position,	 and	 she	 does	 so	 in	 a	 way	 that	 resonates	 firmly	 with	 the	
conception	of	critical	phenomenology	that	I	wish	to	put	forward	here.	Gündoğdu	writes:	
	
[O]nce	 Arendt’s	 conceptualization	 of	 vita	 active	 is	 read	 alongside	 her	 account	 of	 statelessness,	 it	 begins	 to	
appear	in	a	new	light	as	a	critical	phenomenology	providing	crucial	resources	for	understanding	the	conditions	
that	can	make	it	very	difficult	for	some	lives	to	be	recognized	as	human.42	
	
The	rest	of	this	essay	will	endeavour	to	offer	a	more	focused	inquiry	 into	the	exclusionary	
practices	 of	 human	 rights	 discourses	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 critical	 phenomenological	
mode	of	socio-political	inquiry.	
	
The	work	of	Agamben	offers	one	a	 first	 plausible	point	of	 entry	 into	 a	phenomenological	
critique	of	human	rights	discourses.	Gündoğdu’s	repeated	invocations	of	Agamben	probably	
indicates	that	she	knows	this	well.	Like	her,	however,	we	shall	also	not	follow	Agamben	in	this	
pursuit.	It	nevertheless	bears	mentioning	that	his	probing	analyses	of	the	politics	of	the	ban	
can	be	considered	one	of	the	most	forceful	attempts	at	a	fundamental	phenomenology	of	
law	 circulating	 today.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 ban	 (that	 brings	 about	 the	
fundamental	 banning	 of	 sacred	 life	 from	 political	 life)	 pivots	 on	 the	 fundamental	
phenomenological	 insight	 into	 the	 way	 in	 which	 transcendental	 intentionality	 (the	
intentionality	that	constitutes	a	realm	of	consciousness)	performs	an	operation	of	inclusion	
and	 exclusion	without	which	 inclusion	 (the	 selection	 of	 a	 juridico-politico-epistemological	
realm	that	is	not	banned)	is	impossible.	
	
There	are	clear	signals	in	Arendt’s	work	that	her	“wandering	thought”	also	has	its	roots	in	the	
neighbourhood	of	phenomenology,	as	I	argued	before.	It	is	not	necessary	to	re-examine	key	
elements	of	phenomenological	 thinking	 in	her	work	that	 I	examined	then.43	 I	shall	 instead	
engage	 directly	 with	 Maurice	 Merleau-Ponty	 whose	 work	 Arendt	 read	 with	 much	
admiration.44		I	have	also	pointed	out	clear	signs	of	an	influence	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	work	on	
																																																						
41	See	Agamben,	Homo	Sacer,	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1998,	28	–	48;	81	–	86.	
42	Gündoğdu,	162.	It	is	important	to	note	here	also	Sigrid	Weigel’s	argument	that	her	essay	“We	Refugees”	was	
the	gateway	to	this	critical	phenomenology	of	the	political.	See	Weigel	“The	Initial	point	of	Arendt’s	political	
anthropology,”	(fn.	26	above).	
43	Van	der	Walt,	“Law	and	the	Space	of	Appearance,”	63.	
44	See	Arendt’s	letter	to	Heidegger	in	Hannah	Arendt	Martin	Heidegger	Briefe	(Frankfurt	am	Main,	Vitttorio	
Klostermann,	1999)	225.	
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her	own	thought	before	and	it	is	not	necessary	to	do	so	again	here.45	In	what	follows,	I	shall	
only	 take	 recourse	 to	 a	 number	 of	 key	 elements	 of	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 phenomenological	
thinking	that	offer	us	significant	insight	into	Arendt’s	reference	to	the	“hiatus	between	the	
end	of	an	old	order	and	the	beginning	of	the	new”	quoted	in	full	above.46	
	
Merleau-Ponty	refers	repeatedly	and	extensively	 to	a	 fundamental	chiasm	and	fission	–	 le	
chiasme,	la	fission	fondamentale	–	in	his	work	Le	visible	et	l’invisible.47	What	is	at	stake	in	this	
chiasm	 and	 fundamental	 fission?	 The	 literal	 meaning	 of	 fission	 is	 “splitting.”	 The	 literal	
meaning	of	chiasm	is	“crossing.”	Le	visible	et	l’invisible	constitutes	a	sustained	interrogation	
of	a	fundamental	splitting	and	crossing	of	the	visible	and	invisible	through	which	existence	
yields	to	perception.	This	splitting	and	crossing	through	which	existence	becomes	visible	and	
invisible	concerns	the	primal	event	that	gives	birth	to	historical	reality,	that	is,	temporal	reality	
or	space	conditioned	by	time.	Evidently	at	stake	in	the	inquiry	in	Le	visible	et	l’invisible	is	that	
to	 which	 La	 Phénoménologie	 de	 la	 Perception	 already	 refers	 as	 “the	 birth	 of	 history”	 or	
“history	in	the	state	of	its	birth”	-	l’histoire	à	l’état	naissant.48	Of	concern	here	is	the	earliest	
moment	 or	 not-yet	 moment	 in	 which	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 visible	 and	 invisible	
becomes	manifest	for	–	and	before	–	the	first	time.	
	
Phenomenology	is	for	Merleau-Ponty	the	endless	endeavour	to	grasp	the	sense	or	direction	
of	history	in	its	nascent	state.	According	to	him,	phenomenology	pursues	this	birth	of	history	
or	histories	with	“the	same	laborious	attention	and	astonishment”	and	“the	same	exigency	of	
consciousness	 and	will”	 that	 inform	 the	work	 of	 Balzac,	 Proust,	 Valéry	 or	 Cézanne.49	 The	
neighbourhood	of	phenomenology	is	the	neighbourhood	of	novelists,	poets	and	painters,	he	
suggests.	This	is	the	neighbourhood	from	where	it	seems	feasible	to	look	for	answers	to	the	
questions	posed	above:	What	can	we	know	of	the	hiatus,	the	break	in	time,	the	breaking	of	
time?	Who	might	recount	what	happens	when	time	breaks?	And	what	account	can	be	given	
of	this	break?	
	
The	answer	that	Merleau-Ponty	prompts	one	to	offer	in	response	to	the	“who?”	question	is	
evident:	novelists,	poets,	artists	and	philosophers	that	share	the	same	astonishment	at	the	
birth	of	history.	Is	Arendt’s	concern	with	the	hiatus	that	ruptures	the	flow	of	time	not	also	
informed	by	 this	 astonishment	of	 artists,	 poets,	 novelists	 and	phenomenologists	with	 the	
birth	of	history?	Sigwart	nevertheless	cautions	us	against	accepting	this	answer	too	quickly.	
The	 first	 chapters	 of	 his	 book	 are	 substantially	 dedicated	 to	 Arendt’s	 express	 wish	 to	
distinguish	 her	 “wandering”	 political	 theory	 form	 the	 “wondering”	 or	 “wonderment”	 of	
																																																						
45	Van	der	Walt,	“Law	and	the	Space	of	Appearance,”	63	–	88.	
46	Arendt,	On	Revolution,	205,	also	quoted	above	at	fn.	19	above.	
47	Merleau-Ponty	Le	visible	et	l’invisible,	Paris:	Gallimard,	1964,	172	–	204,	268	–	270.	For	a	forceful	discussion	
of	the	crossing	of	the	visible	and	invisible	in	Arendt’s	thought	against	the	background	of	current	refugee	and	
migration	politics,	see	further	also	Marieke	Borren,	“Towards	and	Arendtian	politics	of	In/visibility:	On	
Stateless	Refugees	and	Undocumented	Aliens,”	Ethical	Perspectives:	Journal	of	the	European	Ethics	Network,	
15	(2)	2008,	213	–	237.	I	am	indebted	to	Andrew	Schaap	for	bringing	Borren’s	work	to	my	attention.	
48	Merleau-Ponty	Phénoménologie	de	la	Perception,	Paris:	Gallimard,	1945,	22.		
49	Merleau-Ponty	Phénoménologie	de	la	Perception,	22-23:	“Si	la	phénoménologie	a	été	un	mouvement	avant	
d'être	une	doctrine	ou	un	système,	ce	n'est	ni	hasard,	ni	imposture.	Elle	est	laborieuse	comme	l'œuvre	de	
Balzac,	celle	de	Proust,	celle	de	Valéry	ou	celle	de	Cézanne,	-	par	le	même	genre	d'attention	et	d'étonnement,	
par	la	même	exigence	de	conscience,	par	la	même	volonté	de	saisir	le	sens	du	monde	ou	de	l'histoire	à	l'état	
naissant.”	
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philosophers.	Philosophers	are	too	embroiled	in	their	unique	experience	of	existence;	they	
have	no	inclination	towards	or	knack	for	the	public	wanderings	of	politics	and	political	theory,	
insisted	 Arendt.50	 The	 astonishment	 that	 Merleau-Ponty’s	 phenomenologist	 shares	 with	
artists	and	poets	would	appear	to	pivot	on	exactly	this	philosophical	sense	of	wonderment	
that	Arendt	dismisses	as	unhelpful	for	political	theory.	The	matter	is	nevertheless	not	so	clear	
or	simple.	Arendt’s	political	theory	was	at	least	sometimes	also	enticed	by	the	allure	of	poets	
and	 novelists.	 Sigwart’s	 description	 of	 Arendt’s	 theoretical	 self-localisation	 pays	 specific	
attention	 to	 her	 fascination	 with	 Kafka’s	 narrative	 localisation	 of	 the	 “thinking	 ego”	 in	 a	
“battleground”	 “between	 the	 experiential	 forces	 of	 past	 and	 future.51	 This	 “in	 between	
position	in	time”	“transforms	the	continuously	flowing	stream	of	sheer	change	…	into	time	as	
we	know	it.”	However,	this	“in	between	position”	not	only	allows	for	and	experience	of	time	
as	we	know	it,	it	also	allows	for	“relating	oneself	to	[its]	contradictions.”	In	doing	so,	it	opens	
up	“possibilities	for	a	gradual	withdrawal	from	the	present	and	for	critical	self-reflection.”52	
	
In	other	words,	Kafka’s	narrative	position	intimates	a	moment	of	silent	observation	that	 is	
located	 (or	 locates	 itself)	 outside	 the	 regular	 flow	 of	 time	 and	 current	 concerns.	 Arendt	
discerns	an	element	of	this	stepping	outside	the	current	of	time	and	current	affairs	in	her	own	
theoretical	 position.	 However,	 she	 ultimately	 also	 disqualifies	 Kafka’s	 description	 of	 this	
“stepping	outside”	because	it	“steps	out	too	far.”	Kafka’s	narrative	position	ends	up	in	a	space	
too	removed	from	politics	and	human	affairs,	argues	Arendt.	By	stepping	out	of	the	current	
of	time,	Kafka	no	longer	relates	himself	to	time,	but	ends	up	in	“a	timeless	region	…	beyond	
human	clocks	and	calendars”	about	which	Western	metaphysics	have	been	dreaming	“from	
Parmenides	to	Hegel.”53	
	
An	interesting	point	must	nevertheless	be	noted	here:	In	this	step	towards	and	away	from	
Kafka,	Arendt	narrowly	opens	the	door	for	the	wonderment	of	the	philosopher	and	the	poet	
to	enter	the	affairs	of	the	city.	Sigwart	also	notes	in	this	regard	that	Arendt	ultimately	does	
appropriate	 for	 herself	 and	 for	 political	 theory	 the	 wondering	 or	 thaumazein	 of	 the	
philosopher,	provided	 this	 thaumazein	 remains	 focussed	on	politics	 and	 the	affairs	of	 the	
city.54	Arendt’s	misgivings	about	the	philosophical	tradition’s	penchant	for	an	“individualising	
[and]	almost	isolating	experience”	of	wonderment	obviously	demands	some	reconsideration	
against	 the	 background	 of	 this	 concession	 that	 political	 theory	 is	 ultimately	 also,	 at	 least	
partly,	 claimed	 by	 a	 considerably	 individualising	 and	 isolating	 sense	 of	 wonderment,	 or	
something	very	comparable	to	it.	
	
Arendt	ultimately	draws	away	from	her	fascination	with	Kafka’s	poetic	withdrawal	from	the	
current	of	time	and	the	current	of	current	human	affairs.	Again,	Kafka’s	wondering	ultimately	
wanders	too	far	out,	too	far	away	from	common	human	affairs,	according	to	her.	This	poetic	
thaumazein	 –	 arguably	 even	 a	 step	 or	 two	 further	 out	 and	 away	 from	 the	 city	 than	
philosophical	thaumazein	–	must	return	to	the	world	of	common	human	affairs.	However,	
her	brief	concession	to	this	poetic	wondering	leaves	an	intriguing	trace	on	her	thinking,	or	at	
least	 on	 Sigwart’s	 summation	of	 everything	 that	makes	up	 “the	 affairs	 of	 the	 city”	 in	 her	
																																																						
50	See	again	Sigwart,	11	–	28.	
51	Sigwart,	94	–	95,	referring	to	Arendt,	The	Life	of	the	Mind,	vol.	I,	Thinking,	203.	
52	Ibid.	
53	Sigwart,	95,	referring	to	Arendt,	The	Life	of	the	Mind,	vol.	I,	Thinking,	207.	
54	Sigwart,	99,	referring	to	Arendt,	Philosophy	and	Politics,	103.	
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thinking.	Poetic	wondering	ultimately	appears	to	be	nothing	less	than	one	of	the	key	elements	
of	urbanity	that	is	crucial	for	sustaining	urbanity,	observes	Sigwart.	It	is	the	essential	element	
of	urbanity	 that	prevents	 the	city	 from	descending	 into	a	provincial	affair.	As	he	puts	 in	a	
remarkable	paragraph:	
	
The	citizen’s	amor	mundi,	in	order	to	be	prevented	from	degenerating	into	a	narrow	and	exclusive	provincialism,	
aggressive	forms	of	nationalism,	or	even	into	ideologies	of	complete	collective	self-functionalisation,	needs	to	
be	accompanied	by	the	poet’s	careless	political	irresponsibility,	by	the	novelist’s	affinity	for	uncomforting	and	
even	alienating	experiments,	and	by	the	wandering	political	theorist’s	subversive	propensity	to	transcend	any	
concrete	political	horizon	and	to	question	the	creedal	passion	of	political	deeds,	narratives	and	traditions.”55	
	
Sigwart	 is	 doing	 a	 remarkable	 job	 here	 of	 making	 Arendt	 step	 away	 from	 the	 twee	
hermeneutics	that	at	times	informs	her	conception	of	politics;	a	remarkable	job	of	making	her	
step	closer	to	a	tradition	of	critical	theory	of	which	the	key	characteristic	has	always	been	to	
mark	the	non-identity	between	hermeneutic	practices	and	hermeneutic	realities.	He	does	a	
remarkable	job	of	recording	the	role	that	art	and	poetry	have	always	played	in	exposing	the	
irreducible	 breach	 in	 human	 affairs	 that	 no	 interpretive	 project	 can	 cover	 up	 or	 close.	
Whether	 Sigwart	 is	 remaining	 faithful	 to	 Arendt’s	 texts	 here,	 or	 not,	 is	 ultimately	 not	 an	
important	question.	Perhaps	he	is	really	following	Arendt’s	wandering	thought.	Perhaps	he	is	
venturing	out	on	a	wandering	and	wondering	path	on	his	own.	Suffice	it	just	to	say	that	he	
has	read	her	work	well	enough	to	discern	a	profound	thought	lurking	in	it	that	is	not	often	
recognised	 in	 scholarly	engagements	with	her	 texts.	 This	 thought	 could	be	described	as	a	
concern	 with	 the	 two	 irreducible	 and	 irreconcilable	 trajectories	 that	 claim	 the	 human	
imagination,	 the	 trajectory	 that	 leads	 it	 down	 the	 reasonable	 path	 of	 collaborative	
constructions	of	common	worlds	that	ultimately	produce	law	and	the	orderly	freedom	that	
law	 renders	 possible;56	 and	 the	 trajectory	 of	 deraison,	 as	 Michel	 Foucault	 puts	 it,	 the	
trajectory	that	leads	it	into	the	pursuit	of	a	mad	freedom	common	among	poets	and	artists.57	
	
Were	one	to	endorse	this	thought,	one	could	argue	that	law	and	poetry	mark	the	projected	
opposite	ends	of	the	spectrum	of	possibilities	in	which	the	human	imagination	engages.	One	
could	 then	argue	 further	 that	philosophy	and	political	 theory	 find	 themselves	 somewhere	
more	to	the	middle	of	the	spectrum,	philosophy	probably	somewhat	closer	to	poetry,	political	
theory	 probably	 somewhat	 closer	 to	 law.	 The	 theoretical	 endeavour	 that	 insistently	 and	
consistently	charts	both	these	trajectories	takes	both	these	trajectories	equally	seriously.	It	
engages	 in	 the	 creation	 and	 sustenance	 of	 common	 worlds	 that	 result	 from	 common	
hermeneutic	projects.	But	it	nevertheless	refuses	to	be	walled	up	behind	the	epistemological	
confinement	of	these	worlds.58	It	is	a	thinking	that	surely	takes	its	civil	responsibility	within	
these	 common	worlds	 seriously,	 but	 nevertheless	 remains	 perpetually	 susceptible	 to	 the	
allure	of	a	different	kind	of	thinking	that	relentlessly	explores	the	outsides	of	these	worlds,	as	
Foucault	once	put	it.59	
	
																																																						
55	Sigwart,	127.	
56	This	is	the	trajectory	to	which	Christian	Volk	dedicated	his	recent	monograph	on	Arendt.	See	Volk,	Arendtian	
Constitutionalism.	Law,	Politics	and	the	Order	of	Freedom,	Oxford	and	Portland:	Hart	Publishing,	2015.	
57	See	Michel	Foucault,	Histoire	de	la	folie	à	l’age	classique,	Paris:	Gallimard,	1972,	554	–	557.	
58	As	Derrida	once	pondered	a	Mandela	that	was	not	walled	up	thus.	For	a	discussion,	see	Van	der	Walt,	
“When	Time	Gives,”	38	–	57.		
59	See	Michel	Foucault,	La	pensée	de	dehors,	Paris:	Fata	Morgana,	1986.	
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Assuming,	then,	that	both	these	two	trajectories	are	discernible	in	Arendt’s	work,	one	could	
argue	that	one	is	not	taking	leave	of	her	thought	when,	in	an	attempt	to	find	a	language	that	
might	allow	for	a	real	negotiation	of	the	radically	de-familiarising	otherness	of	refugee	status,	
one	 opts	 for	 following	 her	 down	 the	 path	 opened	 up	 by	 the	 “poet’s	 careless	 political	
irresponsibility	 [and]	 the	 novelist’s	 affinity	 for	 uncomforting	 and	 even	 alienating	
experiments,”	as	Sigwart	puts	it.	We	would	not	be	taking	leave	of	her	thinking	if	we	were	to	
do	so.	We	would	be	opening	it	up	for	a	potential	that	she	acknowledged	occasionally,	but	
predominantly	preferred	to	shelter	in	the	nocturnal	space	to	which	her	essay	“We	Refugees”	
alludes:		
	
But	sometimes	I	imagine	that	at	least	nightly	we	think	of	our	dead	or	we	remember	the	poems	we	once	loved.60	
	
The	oblique	link	that	this	phrase	makes	between	poetry	and	death	is	notable.	It	may	not	lead	
one	all	the	way	to	the	link	between	art	and	madness	that	Foucault	makes	in	the	last	chapters	
of	L’histoire	de	 la	folie,61	but	one	would	have	to	be	quite	wilfully	deaf	not	to	notice	a	real	
resonance	between	these	two	links,	the	link	between	poetry	and	death,	and	the	link	between	
poetry	and	madness.		
	
Why	would	one	opt	 for	noticing	and	registering	–	perhaps	with	some	help	 from	Sigwart	–	
these	 links	 here?	Why	would	 one	 opt	 for	 stressing	 this	 nocturnal	 poetic	 side	 of	 Arendt’s	
thought?	Why	would	one	decide	to	respond	to	her	marginal	–	and	perhaps	only	 implicit	–	
recognition	of	poetry	as	a	retreat	from	the	domesticity	of	civil	politics,	instead	of	following	
her	 down	 the	 central	 line	 that	 runs	 through	 her	work,	 the	 trajectory	 of	which	 takes	 one	
straight	into	a	domiciling	domesticity	from	which	her	famous	distinction	between	the	private	
home	 and	 the	 public	 sphere	 offers	 no	 escape?	 Well,	 we	 have	 seen	 above,	 following	
Gündoğdu,	that	Arendt	herself	told	us	that	that	the	politics	of	domicile	simply	fails	to	include	
the	plight	of	the	stateless	person,	the	very	person	with	whom	we	are	trying	to	arrange	an	
unlikely	meeting	here.	And	we	have	seen	that	close	readers	of	her	work	ultimately	admit	that	
nothing	much	has	changed,	either	in	her	lifetime,	or	in	the	four	decades	that	followed,	in	spite	
of	highly	impressive	expansions	of	international	human	rights	law	that	allegedly	erased	the	
distinction	between	citizens	and	non-citizens.	
	
Hence	the	allure	of	a	different	language	that	does	not	resist,	but	decidedly	pursues	the	most	
radical	de-familiarisation	with	 itself	conceivable;	a	 language	that	relentlessly	harks	back	to	
the	sheer	absurdity	of	existence	that	prevailed	before	ages	of	common	coinage	and	currency	
secured	themselves	by	force	of	the	most	fortified	distinctions	between	the	familiar	and	the	
unfamiliar	thinkable.	The	poem	is	the	place	where	all	tropes	and	metaphors	want	to	be	guided	
into	 absurdity,	writes	 Paul	 Celan:	 ...	 das	Gedicht	wäre	 somit	 der	Ort,	wo	 alle	 Tropen	 und	
Metaphern	 ad	 absurdum	geführt	werden	wollen.62	 In	 other	words,	 the	 poem	 is	 the	 place	
where	language	embarks	on	the	most	fundamental	forfeiture	of	familiarity	thinkable.	When	
																																																						
60	Arendt	“We	refugees”	112.	In	her	paper	“Who	Are	We	–	„We	Refugees"?”,	presented	at	in	Berlin	at	Zentrum	
für	Literatur-	und	Kulturforschung,	15	March	2018,	Susannah	Young-ah	Gottlieb	argues	that	this	concern	with	
the	poetic	played	a	much	more	prominent	role	in	Arendt’s	work	than	I	suggest	here.	More	careful	engagement	
with	her	paper	when	it	becomes	available	may	well	move	me	to	rephrase	some	of	the	contentions	I	make	
above	with	regard	to	the	role	of	poetry	and	the	poetic	in	Arendt’s	work.	
61	Foucault	Histoire	de	la	folie	(fn.	56	above),	554-557.	
62	Paul	Celan,	“Der	Meridian”,	199.	
	 22	
one	follows	the	poem	down	this	path,	it	may	well	lead	one	towards	–	or	into	–	this	forfeiture.	
The	further	one	follows	it,	the	more	must	one	expect	to	forfeit.	The	poem	could	thus	become	
the	 site	 of	 an	 extraordinary	 dispossession;	 the	 site	 of	 the	 most	 complete	 dispossession	
thinkable;	 the	 site	 of	 a	 dispossession	 that	 would	 certainly	 include	 the	 dispossession	 of	
domicile.	
	
	“Ce	 qu’il	 y	 a	 à	 saisir	 est	 un	 déposssession.”63	 That	 which	 needs	 to	 be	 grasped,	 is	 a	
dispossession,	wrote	Merleau-Ponty	in	a	singular	phrase	that	seems	to	echo	his	invocation	of	
the	will	 to	 grasp	 history	 in	 its	 state	 of	 birth	 –	 “la	 …	 volonté	 de	 saisir	 …	 l'histoire	 à	 l'état	
naissant”	–	cited	above.	If	the	poem	is	the	site	of	this	dispossession,	 it	 is	also	the	site	of	a	
meeting	with	the	dispossessed	stranger	who	seeks	asylum,	the	stranger	already	dispossessed	
of	domicile,	the	stranger	who	already	dropped	into	a	crack	in	time	where	history	has	come	to	
an	end	and	has	yet	to	commence	again.	The	poem	is	 indeed	a	secret	meeting	with	such	a	
stranger,	 suggests	Paul	Celan:	 “Das	Gedicht	 ist	…	einsam	und	unterwegs	…	 [a]ber	 steht	…	
gerade	dadurch	…	im	Geheimnis	der	Begegnung.”64	Whether	this	secret	meeting	might	one	
day	inform	a	reform	of	international	human	rights	law,	as	Richard	Rorty	appeared	to	hope,65	
is	a	question	that	we	cannot	and	need	not	pursue	now.	Suffice	it	to	conclude	that	it	holds,	for	
now,	the	only	promise	of	entering	the	crack	in	time	and	space	that	the	asylum	seeker	has	
already	been	compelled	to	enter.	The	poem	holds	the	only	promise	of	meeting	her	on	an	
equal	footing,	the	equal	footing	of	equal	dispossession.	It	is	the	only	promise	of	a	common	
humanity	that	is	conditioned	by	the	hiatus,	instead	of	being	ripped	apart	by	it.	
	
IV.	CONCLUDING	REFLECTIONS	
	
Let	us	 face	what	would	appear	to	be	an	 inescapable	consequence	of	 the	human/inhuman	
condition:	International	law	is	never	going	to	allow	for	an	unequivocal	global	dispossession	of	
national	citizenships	that	will	allow	for	the	standard	and	non-exceptional	recognition	of	global	
citizenship.	The	equivocations	–	pointed	out	by	Gündoğdu	with	reference	to	telling	human	
rights	case	law	–	through	which	international	law	sustains	a	distinction	that	it	claims	to	erase	
are	conditioned	by	a	default	setting	of	human	intentionality.	The	equivocations	that	sustain	
an	 inclusionary-exclusionary	 system	 of	 international	 law	 result	 from	 the	way	 in	which	 all	
notions	of	“humanity”	and	“the	human”	remain	shadowed	by	the	irreducible	“inhumanity”	
and	“non-human”	that	they	exclude.	Only	on	the	back	of	these	exclusions	can	the	concept	or	
ideal	of	humanity	become	a	distinct	focus	point	of	human	intentionality	and,	consequently,	
intentional	political	practices.	The	inclusionary	discourse	of	 international	human	rights	 law	
will	continue	to	be	betrayed	by	exclusionary	human	rights	practices	as	long	as	the	ideal	of	
humanity	itself	remains	a	function	of	an	initial	operation	of	exclusion.	
	
The	global	dispossession	of	national	 citizenships	 that	will	 allow	 for	 the	 standard	and	non-
exceptional	recognition	of	global	citizenship	is	an	unpoetic	fantasy.	It	is	an	unpoetic	fantasy,	
not	because	 it	 is	vulnerable	to	the	accusation	of	bad	poetry,	but	because	 it	entertains	the	
anti-poetic	vision	of	a	general	or	generic	juridical	resolution	of	the	gap	between	language	and	
the	singularity	of	“the	human	condition”	that	emerges	with	every	critical	application	of	law.	
																																																						
63	Merleau-Ponty	Le	visible	et	l’invisible	(1964)	319.	
64	Celan,	Der	Meridian,	197-198.	
65	Richard	Rorty,	“Human	Rights,	Rationality	and	Sentimentality”	in	Stephen	Shute	and	Susan	Hurley	(eds),	On	
Human	Rights:	The	Oxford	Amnesty	Lectures,	New	York:	Basic	Books,	1993.	
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The	singularity	that	comes	to	the	for	here	–	the	unique	case66	–	refuses	integration	into	the	
generic	and	repeatable	terms	of	law.	The	idea	that	an	application	of	law	can	bridge	the	gap	
that	opens	up	here	is	an	unpoetic	fantasy,	because	it	is	a	juridical	fantasy.	
	
It	 is	a	 fantasy,	not	only	because	of	 the	unlikeliness	of	 its	materialisation	when	considered	
against	the	background	of	historical	records,	but	also	because	lack	of	historical	materialisation	
is	exactly	what	conditions	it	as	a	normative	idea.	The	norm-praxis	discrepancy	of	international	
rights	law	that	Gündoğdu	describes	so	well,	is	exactly	what	conditions	the	continuing	validity	
of	the	norm.	The	norm	will	mutate	and	continue	to	recreate	its	criteria	of	compliance	so	as	
to	sustain	the	lack	of	materialisation	that	ensures	its	enduring	validity.67	The	moment	that	it	
no	 longer	does	 this,	 it	 simply	 falls	 silent	 and	 vacate	 the	 scene	of	 political	 and/or	 juridical	
contention,	either	to	allow	for	a	different	register	of	contention,	or	–	may	the	heavens	forbid	
–	 an	 absence	 of	 contention	 that	 would	 imply	 a	 mode	 of	 adaptation	 or	 submission	 to	
contingent	circumstances	that	is	irreconcilable	with	the	Kantian	or	Enlightenment	conception	
of	human	freedom;	a	conception	that	must	still	be	considered	a	key	aspect	of	the	juridical	
fantasy	at	stake	here,	notwithstanding	Moyn’s	forceful	thesis	that	its	current	form	or	format	
is	more	specifically	the	legacy	of	a	conservative	Christianism	of	a	later	age.	It	should	be	noted,	
that	Hans	Kelsen	duly	acknowledged	the	irreducible	gap	between	the	norm	and	its	application	
when	he	emphasised	the	presupposition	of	validity	that	is	needed	to	overcome	the	validity	
deficit	of	the	Foundational	Norm	or	Grundnorm	that	sustains	the	validity	of	the	rest	of	the	
legal	 system	 (as	 conceived	 from	 the	perspective	of	 a	pure	 theory	of	 law).68	 It	 is	with	 this	
presupposition	in	mind	that	it	is	perfectly	apt	and	accurate	to	talk	about	a	juridical	fantasy	
here.	When	Kelsen	tells	us	that	the	law	exists	by	virtue	of	a	presupposition	he	invites	us	to	
act	as	if	the	law	exists.	This	is	the	legal	theoretical	way	of	instructing	us	that	the	law	is	indeed	
nothing	but	a	juridical	fantasy.	
	
Approaching	the	status	of	international	law	in	this	way	–	that	is,	insisting	that	the	validity	of	
the	normative	ideals	of	the	Enlightenment	is	conditioned	by	the	discrepancy	between	these	
ideals	and	any	practice	or	praxis	aimed	at	giving	effect	to	them	–	is	to	present	it	in	terms	of	
Hegel’s	epochal	critique	of	Kant’s	practical	philosophy	in	the	Phenomenologie	des	Geistes.69	
One	can	of	course	also	put	it	in	other	terms.	Another	option	would	be	to	articulate	the	matter	
in	terms	of	a	Socratic	regard	for	the	irreducible	gap	between	idea	and	praxis	which	informs	
Arendt’s	critique	of	human	rights,	according	to	Gündoğdu.		Arendt’s	critique	of	human	rights,	
she	 argues,	 does	 not	 amount	 to	 a	 categorical	 dismissal	 of	 human	 rights	 discourses,	 but	
constitutes	an	ongoing	Socratic	engagement	with	their	irreducible	perplexities	or	aporias	for	
the	sake	of	an	adequately	critical	but	nevertheless	committed	praxis	and	politics	of	human	
rights.70		
	
																																																						
66	Neil	MacCormick	“A	Very	Unique	Case”	in	Zenon	Bankovski	and	James	Maclean,	eds.,	The	Universal	and	the	
Particular	in	Legal	Reasoning	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2006).	(footnote	incomplete).	
67	This	is	the	vintage	point	of	critique	that	Hegel	levelled	at	Kant’s	practical	philosophy.	See	Hegel,	
Phänomenologie	des	Geistes	in	Werke	in	20	Bänden,	Bnd	3,	Frankfurt	a.	M:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1970	[	
1807]:453-464.	
68	Hans	Kelsen,	Reine	Rechtslehre	(Aalen:	Scientia	Verlag,	1994)	66-67.	
69	See	footnote	66	above.	
70	See	especially	Gündoğdu,	25-54	(chapter	2).	
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This	 paper	has	opted	 to	 articulate	 the	discourse/praxis	 discrepancy	with	 reference	 to	 the	
fundamental	exclusionary	operation	of	the	human	mind	that	the	phenomenological	tradition	
of	critical	inquiry	brings	to	one’s	attention.	Edmund	Husserl	already	analysed	the	way	in	which	
human	 intentionality	 is	 the	effect	of	Abschattungen,	 acts	or	 incidences	of	 shadowing	 that	
allows	 for	 the	 zone	 of	 illumination	 associated	 with	 intentionality.	 It	 is	 this	 incidence	 of	
Abschattungen	 that	Merleau-Ponty	re-articulates	 in	Le	visible	et	 l’invisible	as	 incidences	of	
chiasms	and	crossings	between	the	visible	and	the	visible	that	allow	for	the	emergence	of	
determined	or	defined	zones	of	visibility	on	the	basis	of	which	common	space	and	time,	and	
common	lived	realities,	become	possible.		
	
Why	 could	 this	 phenomenological	 approach	 to	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 normative	
discourses	and	praxes,	in	general,	and	human	rights	norms	and	praxes,	in	particular,	offer	a	
promising	alternative	to	dialectic	critiques	of	the	tension	between	concept	and	reality	that	
one	might	associate	with	either	Socratic	or	Hegelian	conceptions	of	dialectics?	It	could	do	so	
because	of	the	way	in	which	it	takes	leave	of	the	idea	that	a	concept,	which	is	essentially	the	
outcome	of	an	operative	exclusion,	can	re-include	what	it	excludes	without	rendering	itself	
inoperative	again.	Any	such	re-inclusion	must	render	the	concept	deeply	dysfunctional.	The	
function	 of	 the	 concept	 is	 to	 exclude	 and	 it	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 perform	 that	 function	
coherently	 if	 it	 is	 to	 inform	any	 kind	of	 praxis	 at	 all.	 The	 return	 to	 the	 excluded	must	 be	
pursued	 fundamentally	 differently,	 and	 it	 is	 this	 fundamentally	 different	 return	 to	 the	
excluded	that	phenomenology	offers.	
	
Following	Merleau-Ponty	(see	again	the	previous	section),	one	can	call	the	initial	operation	of	
exclusion	that	launches	a	whole	trajectory	of	conceptual	exclusion	“the	birth	of	history.”	It	is	
the	 birth	 of	 all	 historical	 projects	 of	 hermeneutic	 generalisation	 and	 exclusion	 that	 soon	
enough	culminate	in	“bounded	forms	of	enlarged	mentality,”	as	Sigwart	calls	it,	the	birth	of	a	
concrete	 sensus	 communis	 of	 an	 actual	 political	 community	 as	 a	 “limited	 ‘space’	 with	
relatively	concrete	and	stable	boundaries.”71	It	is	the	birth	of	this	“limited	‘space’”	that	soon	
enough	also	facilitates	a	comprehensive	regime	of	property	and	“just”	entitlements.	One	may	
well	 ask	whether	 the	 birth	 of	 this	 limited	 space	 is	 not	 fundamentally	 conditioned	 by	 the	
motivation	 to	construct	a	 regime	of	property	and	entitlement,	but	 this	question	need	not	
detain	us	here.	Suffice	it	to	note	that	it	is	this	birth	of	limited	spaces	with	relatively	concrete	
boundaries	 and	 attendant	 property	 regimes	 that	 conditions	 refugee	 status.	 It	 is	 the	
precondition	 for	 refugee	 status.	 Refugee	 status	 depends	 on	 boundaries	 that	 effect	 an	
exclusion	and	registers	the	refugee	as	the	one	who	comes	from	the	outside.	
	
It	 is	 to	 the	 birth	 of	 this	 history	 or	 histories	 of	 “limited	 spaces”	 with	 “relatively	 stable	
boundaries”	to	which	phenomenology	returns,	according	to	Merleau-Ponty.	And	this	return	
to	history	 in	 its	state	of	birth	–	 this	 reversal	of	history	 that	 reaches	back	 into	the	deepest	
recesses	of	its	commencement	as	a	project	of	exclusionary	generalisation	and	distribution	of	
entitlements	 –	 is	 nothing	 but	 an	 act	 of	 dispossession,	 the	 most	 fundamental	 act	 of	
dispossession	possible.	“[S]aisir	le	sens	du	monde	ou	de	l'histoire	à	l'état	naissant”	is	nothing	
but	 “saisir	…	un	déposssession.”	 The	global	dispossession	of	national	 citizenships	 that	will	
allow	for	the	standard	and	non-exceptional	recognition	of	global	citizenship	demands	a	return	
to,	 and	 a	 re-imagination	 of,	 the	 birth	 of	 history.	 It	 demands	 the	 return	 to	 a	 non-juridical	
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language,	 a	 language	 that	 relentlessly	 retreats	 from	 all	 conceptual	 histories	 that	 secure	
frameworks	 of	 entitlement,	 so	 as	 to	 imagine	 a	 completely	 different	 commencement	 of	
history.	
	
The	phenomenological	inquiry	proposed	here	as	an	alternative	path	towards	the	recognition	
of	the	excluded	“other”	does	not	compete	conceptually	with	the	concept.	Instead,	it	retreats	
from	the	concept	and	retreats	from	conceptuality	as	such.	It	seeks	to	return	to	its	origin,	that	
is,	 to	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	 conceptual	 trajectory,	 by	 reversing	 this	 trajectory.	 By	
reversing	the	conceptual	trajectory,	it	seeks	to	catch	a	glimpse	of	history	in	its	state	of	being	
born.	 	 It	seeks	to	catch	a	glimpse	of	that	which	exceeds	and	precedes	time,	“time”	always	
being	the	broadest	conceptual	denomination	of	a	reign	of	already	established	concepts.	It	is	
content	 to	 let	 the	 concept	do	 the	work	 that	 is	 required	of	 it.	 It	 simply	 takes	 leave	of	 this	
conceptual	work	for	the	sake	of	registering	a	“different	time”	that	is	not	really	“a	time,”	but	
the	timeless	zone	that	opens	up	when	time	breaks,	that	is,	when	a	break	between	times	occur,	
when	a	reality	becomes	apparent	that	exceeds	current	time	or	times,	a	reality	that	current	
time	 cannot	 accommodate.	 Taking	 its	 cue	 from	 an	 enigmatic	 passage	 in	 Arendt’s	 On	
Revolution,	this	paper	has	referred	to	this	breaking	of	time	as	the	hiatus.	 It	has	also	taken	
from	Arendt’s	essay	“We	Refugees”	the	cue	to	link	refugee	status	directly	to	this	hiatus,	and	
to	describe	it	as	an	instantiation	of	this	hiatus.	
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	Gündoğdu	 ultimately	 also	 comes	 around	 to	 acknowledge	 the	
necessity	of	the	return	to	the	hiatus.	As	shown	above,	Gündoğdu	expressly	opts	for	Arendt’s	
“working	 through	 the	 perplexities”	 of	 human	 rights”	 instead	 of	 just	 dismissing	 them	 as	
Agamben	does.	However,	her	recognition	of	the	force	of	Agamben’s	critique	may	well	be	one	
of	the	factors	that	moves	her	to	ultimately	articulate	an	acute	understanding	of	this	“working	
through	of	perplexities”	that	ultimately	admits	that	it	 is	not	a	“working	through”	that	is	at	
stake	here,	but	a	return	to	the	beginning,	a	return,	in	fact,	to	the	hiatus.	Early	in	her	book,	she	
already	 stresses	 the	 “aporetic”	 nature	 of	 the	 “working	 through”	 she	 has	 in	 mind,	 with	
reference	to	Arendt’s	use	invocation	of	the	aporias	of	human	rights	in	the	German	translation	
of	OT:	 “Aporien	 der	Menschenrechten.”72	However,	 a	 strict	 reading	 of	 the	word	 “aporia”	
would	suggest	the	aporias	of	human	rights	actually	do	not	allow	one	any	way	through,	as	
especially	 Jacques	 Derrida’s	 close	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 word	 “aporia”	 reminds	 us	 well.73	 The	
working	through	of	the	“aporia	of	human	rights”	that	Gündoğdu	has	in	mind,	can	therefore	
not	entail	a	“working	through”	of	perplexities	in	the	hope	of	resolving	them,	so	as	to	arrive	at	
a	perplexity-free	theory	and	practice	of	human	rights.	
	
Gündoğdu	is	very	clear	about	this.	The	“working	through”	that	she	envisages	is	ultimately	not	
a	matter	of	finding	a	way	through.	It	concerns	an	incessant	return	to	the	“abyss	of	freedom”	
that	 “ruptures	 the	 linear	 continuity	 of	 time.”74	 That	 is	 also	 how	 she	 comes	 to	 interpret	
Arendt’s	enigmatic	notion	of	“a	right	to	have	rights.”	According	to	her,	the	right	to	have	rights	
concerns	the	freedom	to	engage	in	the	constitutive	political	practices	through	which	human	
rights	 regimes	 are	 inaugurated	 and	 sustained.	 These	 practices	 are	 “characterised	 by	
contingency	and	fragility.”	It	is	“by	no	means	certain	that	these	inaugural	practices	will	result	
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in	the	political	and	legal	recognition	of	these	new	rights	claims.”75	To	be	sure,	in	view	of	her	
own	emphasis	on	the	aporetic	status	of	these	rights,	one	must	actually	just	accept	that	they	
won’t	be	recognised;	in	any	case,	not	in	a	way	that	answers	adequately	to	the	promise	they	
seem	to	hold.	That,	however,	does	not	deprive	one	of	the	 irreducible	political	 freedom	to	
return	 to	 the	 abyssal	 commencement	 and	 recommencement	 on	which	 politics	 inevitably	
turns;	the	freedom	to	break	with	the	linear	continuation	of	the	past	and	to	recommence	with	
the	task	of	re-affirming	normative	commitments	that	one	knows	have	a	record	of	failure	and	
are	bound	to	 fail	again.	The	understanding	of	 this	performative	 re-inauguration	of	human	
rights	 –	 rupturing,	 as	 it	 does,	 the	 “linear	 continuity	 of	 time”	 is	 more	 insurrectional	 than	
revolutionary,	 as	Gündoğdu	 suggests	expressly	with	 reference	 to	Étienne	Balibar.76	 In	 this	
respect,	her	understanding	of	 this	performative	 inaugurating	practice	comes	very	close	 to	
what	I	elsewhere	call	the	“renegade	moment”	with	reference	to	Nelson	Mandela’s	and	Bram	
Fischer’s	insurrections.77		
	
We	have	taken	from	Sigwart’s	portrayal	of	Arendt’s	concept	of	political	theory	the	idea	to	
entrust	the	description	of	the	hiatus	of	refugee	status	to	the	one	who	withdraws	from	current	
affairs	and	current	politics,	the	politically	“irresponsible”	and	“careless”	poet,	as	Sigwart	puts	
it,	even	the	mad	poet,	as	Foucault	would	have	 it.	 It	 is	doubtful	whether	Gündoğdu	would	
articulate	the	return	to	the	hiatus	in	this	way.	This	is	not	her	language,	and	it	also	need	not	
be	 her	 language.	 However,	 her	 acute	 description	 of	 the	 political	 freedom	 to	 re-affirm	
normative	ideals	that	have	failed	in	the	past	and	are	likely,	if	not	doomed,	to	fail	again,	takes	
an	 aesthetic	 or	 poetic	 turn	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 her	 book.	 This	 is	 already	 clear	 from	 her	
description	of	 this	 political	 recommencement	 in	 terms	of	 “contingency	 and	 fragility.”	 The	
political	recommencement	that	ruptures	the	flow	of	time	does	not	proceed	from	the	strength	
of	established	concepts,	but	from	particular	observations	that	may	lead	to	the	articulations	
of	new	concepts,	she	avers	with	reference	to	Kant’s	conception	of	reflective	judgment.78	It	
should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 Gündoğdu’s	 engagement	 with	 Arendt	 also	 culminates	 in	 an	
extensive	discussion	of	her	essay	on	Kafka	“The	Jew	as	Pariah.”79	She	is	surely	not	unmoved	
by	the	“poetic	outside”	of	Arendt’s	thoughts	on	human	rights.	Be	it	as	it	may,	it	is	this	return	
to	 the	 hiatus	 of	 time	 through	 a	 return	 to	 poetic	 observations	 of	 “particularity”	 that	 the	
phenomenological	 reversal	 of	 conceptual	 exclusion	 aims	 to	 push	 back	 even	 further	 by	
entrusting	it	to	the	Sigwart’s	irresponsible	and	Foucault’s	mad	poet.	Why?	
	
Why	entrust	this	irresponsible	or	mad	poet	with	the	task	of	recognising	the	hiatus	of	refugee	
status?	Because	this	poet	is	the	only	one	who	would	be	inclined	to	duly	and	persistently	avoid	
the	 language	of	 the	world	 to	describe	what	does	not	belong	 to	 the	world.	 Invocations	of	
“particularity”	does	not	suffice	here,	for	they	already	surreptitiously	invoke	universals	that	
“recognise”	the	particular	as	a	particular.	They	already	begin	“too	late.”	They	already	invoke	
a	 world	 and	 a	 timeframe	 –	 a	 framework	 of	 universals	 –	 within	 which	 particulars	 can	 be	
																																																						
75	Gündoğdu,	166-168.	
76	Gündoğdu,	173.	
77	Van	der	Walt	“When	Time	Gives:	Reflections	on	two	Rivonia	Renegades,”	fn.	4	above.	
78	Gündoğdu,	180.	
79	Gündoğdu,	203-212.	
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registered	as	“particulars.”80	The	“irresponsible”	or	“mad”	poet	is	the	only	one	who	would	
duly	avoid	temporal	or	timely	discourses	to	describe	or	articulate	that	which	does	not	belong	
to	time.	At	stake,	here,	is	a	language	that	even	exceeds	the	invocation	of	particularity,	for	it	
is	aware	that	the	invocation	of	particularity	is	always	already	reflectively	on	its	way	back	to	
the	universal.		
	
This	 is	 the	 instruction	 we	 receive	 from	 Paul	 Celan’s	Meridian	 Rede.	 Celan	 refers	 to	 this	
timeless	hiatus	that	precedes	and	exceeds	time	as	a	“date.”	The	poet	endeavours	to	wrest	
from	 time,	 a	 unique	 and	 unrepeatable	 date.	 The	 poem	 is	 the	 endeavour	 to	 prevent	 the	
assimilation	of	the	date	in	and	by	the	flow	of	time.	The	poem	is	nothing	less	than	an	attempt	
to	pause	the	time	machine,	and	thus	to	observe	something	that	cannot	be	observed	from	the	
currents	 of	 time	 and	 the	 cinematic	 stages	 of	 the	 world;	 an	 attempt	 to	 observe,	 not	 a	
timeframe,	but	a	timelessness	that	cannot	be	framed;	a	timelessness	that	withdraws	from,	
and	disappears	between,	the	frames	or	frameworks	of	time.		
	
Such	was	the	date	of	the	20	of	January	that	Büchner	sought	to	rescue	from	the	flow	of	time	
when	he	described	Lenz’s	journey	through	the	mountain,	suggests	Celan.		Who	else	then,	but	
the	poet,	someone	like	Büchner,	but	surely	also	someone	like	Celan	himself,	can	describe	the	
refugee’s	 journey	 through	 the	endless	dessert,	her	 flight	 from	the	al-Shabab	soldiers	who	
murdered	her	father	and	mother	and	the	father	of	her	own	children	in	front	of	her	eyes?81	
Who	will	describe	this	voyage	of	which	every	step	takes	her	further	and	further	away	from	
the	children	she	left	in	the	care	of	others	in	pursuit	of	the	mad	idea	that	Europe	might	one	
day	offer	them	an	escape	from	hell?	Perhaps	he	who	is	making	a	similar	journey	and	knows	
the	utter	recommencement	it	demands.	Yousif	M.	Qasmiyeh	writes:	“They	have	all	come	to	
re-originate	the	beginning	with	their	hands	and	feet.”82	
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